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THE DRUG COURIER PROFILE: "ALL SEEMS
INFECTED THAT TH' INFECTED SPY, AS
ALL LOOKS YELLOW TO THE
JAUNDIC'D EYE"*
CHARLES L. BECTONt
To combat the rising tide of illegal drugs in this country, agents of
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) have developed the "drug courier
profile. " The profile consists of numerous factors or characteristics that
purportedly signal the agent whether a particular airline passenger car-
ries drugs on his or her person. Relying on the profile, agents have ob-
served putative drug couriers in airline terminals and then questioned,
detained, and searched them. Judge Becton of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals analyzes the inconsistencies and empirical inadequa-
cies that adhere to the DEA's profile; he critiques the courts' apparent
willingness to accept the profile's validity without careful scrutiny. In
his conclusion, Judge Becton urges the courts to examine closely each
proposed profile characteristic to determine its validity on traditional
fourth amendment grounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was a maxim with Foxey .... "Always suspect everybody. "
Being the last passenger to disembark from a commercial airline flight that
originated in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the casually dressed black male ner-
vously checked his watch, walked quickly through the concourse, and tried to
leave the airport in a taxi. Before the passenger could enter the taxi, however, he
was stopped for questioning by two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents.
Why did the DEA agents stop this passenger? Was he a drug smuggler? Did
the DEA agents violate any of the passenger's constitutional rights?
Between 1976 and 1986 over 140 reported cases involved airport stops by
DEA agents based on the "drug courier profile. ' 2 These are in addition to the
* 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE 68 (1871).
t Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals. B.A. 1966, Howard University; J.D. 1969, Duke
University; L.L.M. 1986, University of Virginia.
1. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (quoting C.
DICKENS, THE OLD CURIOSITY SHOP (1841)).
2. This figure is based on the author's survey of reported cases as of November 1, 1986. One
authority describes the DEA's use of drug courier profiles as follows:
Since 1974, the federal Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA] has assigned agents to
certain airports as part of a nationwide program to intercept drug couriers transporting
narcotics between major drug sources and distribution centers in the United States. Fed-
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substantial number of unreported cases.3 This statistic does not include those
airline passengers whom DEA agents stopped, questioned, and searched, but
allowed to leave after discovering no drugs, and those airline passengers who,
after an initial approach, refused to accompany an agent or consent to a search.
4
In light of its frequency and potential for abuse, the drug courier profile search
raises significant constitutional and socio-statistical issues that require careful
consideration.
Courts have characterized the drug courier profile as a "rather loosely for-
mulated ' 5 and "informal, apparently unwritten, checklist ' 6 that purportedly in-
dicates to an experienced DEA agent 7 that an airline passenger may be engaged
in illicit drug activities. As part of the DEA's airline surveillance program to
intercept illegal drugs, the drug courier profile focuses on the conduct and ap-
pearance of air travelers. Based solely on the fact certain airline passengers'
behavior and appearance comport with the drug courier profile, DEA agents
have identified possible narcotics couriers and then stopped, questioned, and ar-
rested these individuals.8
eral agents have developed "drug courier profiles" describing the characteristics generally
associated with narcotics traffickers, and travelers with some of those characteristics are
occasionally stopped at these airports for further investigation.
3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3, at 53
(Supp. 1986). The program was first implemented at Detroit Metropolitan Airport in the fall of
1974. See United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
In its most recent effort to stem the flow of illicit drugs entering the country, the DEA has
focused on airline baggage handlers and maintenance crew members. Large amounts of narcotics
allegedly are stored on airplanes and in checked luggage. On February 13, 1986, the Associated
Press announced that the Justice Department was "preparing indictments against about 50 employ-
ees of Eastern Airlines believed to be smuggling cocaine from South America .... The [baggage]
handlers are said to be key to a narcotics pipeline bringing cocaine into the United States from
Bogota, Columbia, by way of Miami, where the carrier is based." News and Observer (Raleigh,
N.C.), Feb. 13, 1986, at 11A, col.6.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Key, No. CR77-323A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 1978).
4. The DEA does not keep comprehensive statistics on the drug courier profile program. See
Brief for the United States at 32 n.24, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (No. 78-
1821); 1 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 16.2(f), at 16-14 (2d
ed. 1985). In none of the few cases citing statistical data as evidence of the program's success has the
DEA presented statistics on the number of suspects whom agents have approached but not arrested.
For example, in United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
the court said: "Some drug enforcement agents ... were recognized as having made stops in a
substantial number of past instances where their suspicions proved to be correct but without evi-
dence as to the number of instances in which innocent passengers had been subjected by them to
investigatory stops." Accord United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1352 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980); see also United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d
859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1973) (discounting officer's testimony that he had made twenty to thirty arrests
of illegal aliens during the two years preceding the stop in dispute because of the officer's failure to
testify about the number of people he erroneously detained).
5. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719 (6th Cir. 1977).
6. United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979).
7. In some of the earlier drug courier profile cases courts generally failed to list the experience
of the testifying agent because they apparently presumed or failed to question the agent's experience.
Notable exceptions include United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1343 (2d Cir. 1979) ("the fact
that the luggage was not tagged gains significance from Whitmore's estimate that over 90 percent of
the luggage he observes carries the identification required by the airlines.") and United States v.
Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501 (2d Cir. 1979). In later cases, for example Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1,
2 (1984) (per curiam), the records contain explicit references to the agents' experience and training.
8. Many drug courier stops are based on tips (some anonymous, some from informants), prior
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Each facet of this procedure carries fourth amendment implications. 9
These implications, in turn, invite courts to reexamine constitutional standards
involving probable cause and reasonable suspicion:10 the propriety of the initial
stop, identification, and questioning of airline passengers; the moment of seizure,
custodial detention, or arrest; and the consensual or nonconsensual nature of the
search. Not surprisingly, the DEA's use of the drug courier profile has not es-
caped Supreme Court review.1
The drug courier proffle raises a threshold socio-statistical question: "Is it
sufficient that the behavioral characteristics of the suspect in a particular envi-
ronment tend to place that suspect in a class which in the past has demonstrated
a high probability of criminal conduct?" 12 A related question asks what types of
conduct and appearance indicate that an airline traveler is carrying illegal drugs.
Based solely on the fact the behavior described in the following-or substan-
law enforcement investigations, and other factors in addition to the drug courier profile. See United
States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 564 (6th Cir.) ("this case does not involve a stop based on the
much abused drug courier profile, but represents a rare instance of an anonymous tip providing the
basis for the stop"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 573 n. 11 (1980) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.) ("Indeed,
the statistics Mr. Justice Powell cites on the successes of the program at the Detroit Airport... refer
to the results of searches following stops 'based upon information acquired from the airline ticket
agents, from [the agents'] independent police work,' and occasional tips, as well as observations of
behavior at the airport.") (quoting United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich.
1976), aff'd sub noa. United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1011 (1978)).
In some instances airport security checkpoint personnel, who screen and may observe large
bundles of cash in briefcases or hand luggage, alert DEA agents. United States v. McClain, 452 F.
Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977). In other instances airline ticket agents, using profile lists supplied
by DEA agents, report suspicious behavior to the agents. See United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d
1221, 1222 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Allen, 644 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir.
1977); United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub noma. United
States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). See generally Note,
Drug Courier Profile Stops and the Fourth Amendment Is the Supreme Court's Case of Confusion in
its Terminal Stage?, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 217, 229-30 ,(1981) (discussing the DEA's use of the
profile to combat domestic drug traffic, and the role played by tips from airline ticket agents).
9. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
10. As a matter of constitutional law, the courts require that a governmental official must base
the apprehension and arrest of a criminal suspect on probable cause and reasonable suspicion. The
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), is a seminal case recognizing that
fourth amendment protections extend to non-traditional arrests. For a discussion of Terry and the
applicability of fourth amendment protections to airport stops, see infra notes 307-53 and accompa-
nying text.
11. See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980).
12. Comment, Profile Stops and the Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Suspicion or Inarticulate
Hunches?, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L, REv. 112, 116 (1980); see also Underwood, Law and the Crystal
Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408
(1979) (discussing the process of prediction and the objections and reactions to particular prediction
methods).
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tially similar-scenarios comported with the drug courier profile, DEA agents
have approached, detained, and arrested airline passengers:
(1) Arriving from Los Angeles, the white male had an "unusual
limp" and "a very obvious, large bulge on the right inside calf.'
13
(2) The nervous Hispanic had no luggage and continued to look
over his shoulder as he walked in an unusual pattern in the terminal,
having completed his cross-continental flight from California.14
(3) After disembarking and then staring at two plain-clothed
federal DEA agents, this female, who had purchased a one-way ticket
from Los Angeles to the Dallas-Fort Worth airport with cash, rushed
to the ladies' room with her new luggage.15
(4) "[Pulvano] was dressed in blue jeans and a wrinkled long-
sleeve shirt with his shirt tail hanging out. It was this attire that first
brought [Pulvano] to the attention of [the drug agents]. Particularly,
Agent Mathewson thought appellant's appearance was 'disheveled'
and not in conformance with that of the other passengers on the flight,
most of whom appeared to be businessmen."
16
(5) "Royer was first observed by [DEA agents] as he walked
across the concourse of the [airport] towards the National Airlines
ticket counter, carrying two apparently heavy-laden suitcases ...
[T]hose aspects of Royer's behavior which attracted the attention of
the officers ... were the facts that (a) Royer was carrying American
Tourister baggage of a type which 'seemed to be standard brand for
marijuana smuggling'.... "17
(6) DEA agent Paul Markonni took just four minutes to select
his suspect. "Williams was carrying a small tote bag which did not
appear to be full" when he stepped off the flight from Miami at the
Atlanta International Airport. "Williams walked away from the gate
at a rapid pace and glanced twice back at the departing gate." He
claimed no luggage, and, after exiting on the upper level, he glanced
around quickly and walked toward the short-term parking lot.18
(7) As the last passenger to disembark from a commercial air-
line flight originating in Los Angeles, a source city, 19 the casually
dressed black male nervously checked his watch, walked quickly
13. See United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 1979)
14. See United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
15. See United States v. Key, No. CR-77323A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 1978).
16. United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1152 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979),petition denied, 397 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). American Tourister luggage allegedly is so well insu-
lated that drug sniffing dogs have trouble detecting narcotics stored in it. See J. MONAHAN & L.
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 223 (1985).
18. United States v. Williams, 647 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981); see Bodine,
Selecting Drug 'Suspects' Use of Courier Profile at U.S. Airports Lands DEA in Controversy, Nat'l
L.J,, July 27, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
19. A "source city" is a city from which dealers ship illegal drugs to other points for sale or
further distribution. See United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980).
The place of sale is the "use city." Occasionally, courts refer to the source city as the "shipping
city." See United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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through the concourse, and tried to leave the airport in a taxi.20
These scenarios provide just seven among hundreds of similar examples in-
volving imaginative profile characteristics. DEA agents have used creative testi-
mony to describe those factors they claim aroused their suspicion about
particular passengers. They have justified a search based on the fact the passen-
ger traveled with new suitcases, 2 1 had fair skin and displayed no tan,22 methodi-
cally folded a ticket before discarding it,23 or bounced a golf ball.24 Some agents
have admitted candidly that they stop passengers based on "anything that
arouses [their] suspicions" 25 or on a "number of deviant characteristics" that
allegedly are unique to persons who transport narcotics.26 Notwithstanding
these admissions, "uniqueness" does not constitute a sine qua non. Rather, it
satisfies both agents-who deem it sufficient-and the courts-who accept it as
significant-if the profile characteristics manifest themselves disproportionately
in persons transporting narcotics.
Since 1980 the Supreme Court has had four occasions to consider drug cou-
rier profile issues.27 United States v. Mendenhal128 marked the Court's first
foray into the drug courier profile thicket. Painting with a broad, albeit frayed,
brush, the Mendenhall plurality elevated the profile to an undeservedly lofty
perch by fashioning a "free to leave" test.29 Under that test a seizure occurs,
and fourth amendment analysis applies, "only if, in view of all of the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave."' 30 Apparently appreciating the height at which the
profile had been precariously perched, the Supreme Court in Reid v. Georgia,
3 1
decided just one month after Mendenhall, began to backtrack from its initial
position. The Reid Court concluded that the drug courier profile was "too slen-
der a reed to support the seizure in this case.
32 Later, in Florida v. Royer,33
20. See United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
21. United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
22. In United States v. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 836 (1984), the court stated: "The officers' attention was attracted to the two young men
because of their anxious manner, suspicious conduct, casual dress and the fact that Holmes was fair-
skinned and displayed no tan; all factors fitting the DEA 'drug courier profile'... ." Id. at 1092
(footnote omitted).
23. Knapper v. State, 629 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
24. People v. Blevins, 118 I1. App. 3d 221, 222, 454 N.E.2d 802, 803 (1983).
25. United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (admission of DEA
agent Harold Wankel).
26. United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 725, 728 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (admission of DEA
agent Paul Markonni), aff'd in part and vacated in part without opinion sub nom. United States v.
Roseborough, 571 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1978).
27. See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980).
28. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
29. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 280-83, 356-71.
30. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (footnote omitted).
31. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
32. Id. at 441. The Reid Court described the profile as "a somewhat informal compilation of
characteristics believed to be typical of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics." Id. at 440. This
description is not as favorable as that of the concurring justices in Mendenhall, who described the
1987]
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which held that the drug agents' actions in that case exceeded the permissible
bounds of an investigative stop,34 Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion
said "the function of the 'profile' has been somewhat overplayed" and character-
ized the profile as "the collective or distilled experience of narcotics officers con-
cerning characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smugglers."' 35 In its latest
airport-search case, Florida v. Rodriguez,36 decided in November 1984, the
Court never once used the words "drug courier profile" although the per curiam
opinion is replete with drug courier profile concepts-source city, furtive ac-
tions, strange and unusual behavior, attempt to evade the officers, and the of-
ficers' special training in narcotics surveillance and apprehension.
37
This Article explores whether the drug courier profile is based on science or
alchemy and whether it can withstand the crucible of cross-examination. It also
explores when and how profile searches implicate fourth amendment rights, and
whether the Supreme Court's characterization of the profile as "well-planned
and highly specialized" and the Court's commendable concern "in detecting
those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit"3 8 led the Court
initially to abdicate its responsibilities under the fourth amendment. 39 Although
this Article discusses many federal cases and a few state cases, it focuses on the
four United States Supreme Court cases on this issue,4° illustrating why they
have provided lower federal courts with little guidance in this area. Finally, in
discussing the proper role of the drug courier proffle in our legal system, the
profile as a "highly specialized law enforcement operation." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 562 (Powell, J.,
concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
33. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
34. Id. at 507.
35. Id. at 525 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Now, even the DEA refers to the profile as an
investigative technique. See J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 17, at 223-24; Bodine, supra
note 18, at 32, col. 4. The DEA originally argued that a traveler's conformance to the profile estab-
lished the probable cause needed for an arrest, but courts generally rejected that argument. See
United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 543 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978). DEA agents next
argued that conformance with the profile established the reasonable and articulable suspicion justify-
ing an investigatory stop. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 568 n.l (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
36. 469 U.S. 1 (1984) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 3-6. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court agreed with Professor Yale Kamisar
that "[c]alling it a 'profile' makes it sound so scientific" when, in fact, it is not, Bodine, supra note 18,
at 32, col. 2-3, or simply decided not to use the words "drug courier profile" in Rodriguez. Justice
Powell in his concurring opinion in Royer may have provided a hint of things to come when he
referred to Royer as "an airport 'stop for questioning' case." Royer, 460 U.S. at 508 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
38. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561-62 (Powell, J., concurring). The House Select Committee on
Narcotics, chaired by Charles Ringle (D-NY), in its March 7, 1985, Associated Press news release
stated: "Narcotics sales in the United States have skyrocketed at a rate of $10 billion annually since
1978, grossing $110 billion for traffickers last year." Narcotics Sales Keep Soaring, Durham Morning
Herald (Durham, N.C.), Mar. 7, 1985, at IA, col. 5. Justice Rehnquist has stated that the smuggling
of illicit narcotics is a "veritable national crisis." United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct.
3304, 3309 (1985).
39. See Costantino, Cannavo, & Goldstein, Drug Courier Profiles and Airport Stops: Is the Sky
the Limit?, 3 W. Naw ENG. L. REV. 175, 196 (1980); Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall
and Reid- Analyzing Police Intrusions on Less Than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49, 53
(1981).
40. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
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Article demonstrates why the Mendenhall "free to leave" test41 is unworkable.
In its place, the Article recommends the adoption of a bright line rule under
which all airport stops based solely on the drug courier profile would constitute
seizures for fourth amendment purposes. Thus, any such stop would trigger
traditional fourth amendment analysis and require reasonable suspicion before
further probing could be conducted.
IL THE DRUG COURIER PROFILE
A. Origin
Efforts to determine criminality through the observation of individual char-
acteristics and behavioral traits are not recent phenomena. Since the beginning
of time religious zealots, as well as sociologists and criminologists have sought to
predict criminal behavior based on certain "deviant characteristics"; they have
matched individuals to preconceived plans, guidelines, or profiles.42 Although
professional and lay efforts to predict criminal conduct prompt serious "ques-
tions of accuracy and questions of legitimacy," 43 these efforts persist.
The use of profiles is an increasingly popular law enforcement tool.44 Most
prominent among the profiles in use today are those used to identify hijackers
45
41. In the lead opinion Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concluded that, for fourth
amendment purposes, a seizure occurs "only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 554.
42. See Underwood, supra note 12, at 1413-14 (discussing modem ramifications of such efforts
to predict criminal behavior).
43. Underwood, supra note 12, at 1409.
44. Bodine, supra note 18, at 1, col. 2.
45. The Federal Aviation Administration instituted a "hijacker profile" as part of a multi-
pronged screening system that the agency used at domestic airports from 1968 to 1973. Note, The
Airport Search and the Fourth Amendment" Reconciling the Theories and Practices, 7 UCLA-
ALASKA L. REV. 307, 307-08 (1978). One Article described the profile as follows:
The profile was begun in October, 1968, by a task force of agencies including the
FAA, the Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce. This task force com-
pleted a detailed study of the characteristics of all then known air hijackers and identified
certain attributes supposedly distinguishing potential air hijackers from the general public.
With some modification, these characteristics were eventually compiled into a "profile" of
a potential skyjacker, consisting of approximately twenty-five characteristics ....
Informed discussion about the profile is difficult because the characteristics are secret.
However, these characteristics are ostensibly based on the behavioral characteristics of em-
barking passengers rather than on inherited or social characteristics ....
As initially devised, a suspect selected by the profile (a "selectee") was subjected to an
examination by a magnetometer to determine whether he was carrying a significant
amount of metal.
McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV.
293, 302-03 (1972) (footnotes omitted); see also Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air
Pirates, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1004, 1008 (1973) (discussing psychological characteristics of hijackers).
One commentator has noted: "Studies asserted that application of the profile would clear
99.5% of air travellers, but would clear no potential hijackers." Comment, supra note 12, at 121
(citations omitted). One source describes the current status of the profile as follows:
In 1973, the policy changed to the currently existing one, whereby all airline passengers,
not just specially selected ones, pass through a magnetometer. There was then no need for
a behavioral profile to identify persons likely to be in the possession of weapons, since the
1987]
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and those used to identify persons who smuggle illegal aliens into the country.4 6
Less prominent are the drug smuggling vessel profile,
47 the stolen car profile,4 8
the stolen truck profile,4 9 the alimentary-canal smuggler profile, 50 the battering
magnetometer accomplished this task by screening everyone. The FAA therefore discon-
tinued the use of the hijacker profile in 1973.
In 1980, however, there was a series of plane hijackings in which the hijacker had
boarded the plane in possession of a plastic flask filled with gasoline and a cigarette lighter.
The plastic flask had not activated the magnetometer. As of 1980, the FAA began to
deploy the hijacker profile again in order to identify persons who would hijack a plane with
the use of a nonmetalic weapon.
J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 17, at 212 (citations omitted).
46. "In 1979, a total of 1,002,996, or 93 percent of all deportable aliens entered the United
States in ways other than ports of entry; 99 percent of these were made across the Mexican border."
Comment, Immigration Roving Border Patrols: The Less Than Probable Cause Standard for a Stop,
10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245 n.1 (1982). In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975),
a random roving-patrol stop case, the United States Supreme Court discussed the following potential
elements of an alien smuggling profile, on which officials could base reasonable suspicion: (1) travel-
ing near the border; (2) on a lightly traveled road; (3) in a notorious smuggling area; (4) in a car that
appears to be heavily loaded or has an extraordinary number of passengers, or has large compart-
ments suitable for storing aliens; (5) driven by someone of Mexican ancestry; (6) who takes evasive
action or drives erratically; and (7) who is carrying passengers exhibiting characteristics of Mexican
residents who appear to be trying to hide. See Comment, supra note 12, at 117-18; see also United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (holding that a fourth amendment seizure occurred when
border patrol officer stopped the vehicle but that the officer had a "particularized suspicion" that
defendant was smuggling illegal Mexican aliens into the United States); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (permitting stops of all vehicles at permanent checkpoints as well as
questioning of the occupants, even though no reason exists to believe the stopped vehicle contains
illegal aliens).
47. The United States Coast Guard employs a profile of vessels likely to be used in smuggling
drugs into the country as part of its enforcement program. See Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smug-
gling, the Fourth Amendment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARV. L. REV. 725, 730 (1980)
(officials often stop vessels based on convergence of profile characteristics with their observation of
activity of vessels); Note, supra note 8, at 220 n.19. The profile characteristics include suspect ves-
sels, United States v. Kleinschmidt, 596 F.2d 133, 135-36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927
(1979); burlap bags on deck, United States v. Caraballo, 571 F.2d 975, 976 (5th Cir. 1978); "im-
proper markings, no permanently attached name or home port; failure to fly a flag; failure to identify
itself; the condition of the vessel; and unusual activities aboard the vessel," United States v. May
May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 389 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
48. To intercept vehicles "commonly stolen in Phoenix and Tucson," a team of federal and
Arizona law enforcement officers stopped vehicles heading towards Mexico that met "a specified
profile." United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239, 240 (9th Cir. 1975). In Carrizoza-Gaxi-
ola the government argued that reasonable suspicion for the stop existed because:
(1) a man appearing to be Mexican (2) was driving towards Nogales on a highway from
Tucson (3) in a new-appearing late-model Ford LTD (4) with Sonora, Mexico license
plates; in addition, (5) each week some, but less than 30, late-model Ford LTD's are stolen
in the Tucson and Phoenix areas and remained unrecovered, and (6) some of those cars
turn up in Mexico.
Id. at 241; see also State v. Taras, 19 Ariz. App. 7, 10, 504 P.2d 548, 551 (1972) (discussing the
reasonableness of a decision to stop a car to check on ownership). See generally Comment, supra
note 12, at 119 (discussing the stolen car profile).
49. In United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1979), for example, FBI agent
Thomas Summers, Jr., "conducting an inspection to locate stolen vehicles ... as they entered the
United States from Mexico [selected] late-model pick-ups, especially Fords and Chevrolets, as being
likely to have been stolen in the United States and transported to Mexico." Id. at 546.
50. In 1983 United States customs officers detained Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez be-
cause she fit the alimentary canal smuggler profile. Specifically, de Hernandez
had paid cash for her ticket, came from a source port of embarcation, carried $5,000 in
U.S. currency, had made many trips of short duration into the United States, had no family
or friends in the United States, had only one small piece of luggage, had no confirmed hotel
reservations, did not speak English, and said she was planning to go shopping using taxis
for transportation.
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parent profile,5 1 and the poacher profile.5 2 In 1983, based on interviews with
alleged mass murderer Henry Lee Lucas, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) attempted to compile a serial killer profile.53 To a lesser extent, profiles
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3313 n.2 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, J.) (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1371 n.3
(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985)). Significantly, officers discovered the factors listed
above only after they had questioned Hernandez. She was detained and questioned solely because
her passport revealed "that she had made at least eight recent trips to either Miami or Los Angeles."
Id. at 3307. A rectal examination produced one cocaine-filled balloon that Hernandez had swal-
lowed and was smuggling in her alimentary canal. After her arrest, officers discovered that she
carried a total of 88 balloons. Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3308.
Some court officials in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refer to this
profile as the "Columbian mule" profile, and middle-aged Columbian women are often the smug-
glers. Interview with Peter Beer, United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of
Louisiana (July 1985); see United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1983) (75 balloons); see
also United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (listing Columbia as a lead-
ing source country). "Columbian mule" is a regional classification, however, and most courts con-
tinue to use the term "alimentary canal smuggler profile." Cf. People v. Warren, 91 A.D.2d 1007,
1008, 457 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1983) (Defendant, after arriving in New York on a flight from India, a
"source country," carrying only one piece of luggage, was subjected to a body cavity search that
"produced nine condoms tied with dental floss and containing heroin.").
51. In State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981), the Minnesota Supreme Court explained
the testimony of Dr. ten Bensel:
[T]he "battering parent" syndrome is an "inner [sic] generational phenomena" in that
adults who abuse their children were often abused themselves. The doctor testified that
abusing parents frequently experience role reversal and often expect their children to care
for them. He also stated that battering parents often exhibit similar characteristics such as
low empathy, a short fuse, low temper, short temper, low boiling point, high blood pres-
sure, strict authoritarianism, uncommunicativeness, low self-esteem, isolation and lack of
trust.
Id. at 62-63. In Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983), Dr. Kennedy, without citing a
specific source for the profile or attempting to show its scientific validity,
constructed a profile of the typical abusive [female] parent. He testified that the character-
istics of an adult who abuses a child in a life threatening fashion almost always are, first,
that the parent herself is the product of a violent, abusive environment and usually com-
mits violent acts with growing frequency; second, that the parent is under some kind of
chronic environmental stress; caused by, for example, money or housing problems, and is
frequently a single parent; third, that the parent has a history of poor social judgment in
that she tends to be impulsive or explosive under stress; fourth, that the child she abuses is
the product of an unplanned, difficult and unpleasant pregnancy and is prematurely born;
fifth, that the abused child is a chronically difficult child, either sickly or frequently crying.
Id. at 73-74, 303 S.E.2d at 16. The battering parent profile involves "past" conduct as opposed to
"present" or "future" conduct. Courts hesitate to accept social science evidence to identify those
who have committed crimes in the past. See J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 17, at 228.
52. In State v. Tourillott, 289 Or. 845, 618 P.2d 423 (1980), the police established a roadblock
to apprehend illegal hunters. The police stopped all cars, except cars containing "older people or
others who did not appear to have been hunting," and questioned the drivers of the remaining vehi-
cles. Id. at 848, 618 P.2d at 425.
53. The Justice Department's National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes "will focus on
serial killers-who murder large numbers of strangers over a period of time, often across state lines
and with no apparent motives .... Psychological profiles are based on information about a suspect's
background, personality strengths and weaknesses, the crime scene, and victims' wounds ...."
USA Today, July 11, 1984, at 3A, col. 4-6. In 1984 over $2.5 million was appropriated for the serial
killer profile operation based in part on statistics from the last five years showing that "the number of
unresolved killings has grown from 10% to 27%." Id.
Recently, Lucas' credibility has been undermined. An Associated Press news release stated:
Case after case against alleged serial killer Henry Lee Lucas has unraveled, and many
investigations are being reopened. Lucas, considered the deadliest serial killer in U.S. his-
tory after he began confessing to hundreds of murders after he was arrested in Texas in
1983, is now widely viewed as the perpetrator of a gigantic hoax. He "took a lot of people
for a ride," said Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox. A Dallas Times Herald survey of
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are developing to help identify serial rapists, child molesters, and arsonists, and
the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes plans to expand its oper-
ation in an effort to track down these criminals. 54These profiles are narrower
than the drug courier profile. They are regional in scope and implicate fewer
people suspected of criminal activity. Thus, none is used as extensively as the
drug courier profile.
Many of the drug courier profile characteristics are in fact empirically
based. Before developing the drug courier profile, DEA agents learned the mo-
dus operandi of cross-country drug distributors and couriers through conversa-
tions with undercover operators, informants, and cooperative defendants-those
arrested on drug charges as well as convicted codefendants who turned state's
evidence. As DEA Agent Markonni explained in United States v. McClain,55
"[t]he majority of our cases, when we first started, involved cases we made based
on information from law enforcement agencies or from airline personnel. And
as these cases were made, certain characteristics were noted among the
defendants."
'5 6
DEA agents even relied on the hijacker profile to help them determine how
a drug courier would act. For example, when Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) officers stopped Lee Skipwith III in 1971 because he fit the hijacker pro-
file, they discovered not only that he possessed cocaine, but also that he carried
lawmen in charge of investigating 191 murder cases closed by the Ranger-led Lucas Homi-
cide Task Force shows that 90 now are considered unsolved.
Durham Morning Herald (Durham, N.C.), Nov. 30, 1985 at 14A, col. 3. Evidence placing Lucas far
from the scenes of many of his confessed crimes likely will have little effect on the serial killer profile
because many people remain convinced that Lucas killed numerous people. Id.
54. USA Today, July 11, 1984, at 3A, col. 3. As evidence of the widespread attempted use of
profiles, see State v. Hickman, 337 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 1983) (proffered testimony by the State con-
cerning a "rapist" profile), and State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982) (proffered testi-
mony by a defendant that he did not fit the profile of a rapist).
55. 452 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
56. Id. at 199.
DEA agents also note certain characteristics exhibited by drug couriers who use ground, rather
than air, transportation. A profile of drug smugglers who use the interstate highway system appar-
ently has been developed. An October 27, 1986, news article revealed the following:
N.C. Highway Patrol Trooper Terry L. Isaacs works a stretch on Interstate 95 in
Cumberland County, catching drug smugglers with the subtle expertise of a fly fisherman.
Isaacs is an example of the patrol's new focus on drug smugglers ....
During a special training session taught by federal drug enforcement agents in Atlanta
last spring, Isaacs and six other North Carolina troopers learned how routine traffic stops
sometimes can lead to major drug arrests.
For Isaacs, a 10-year veteran of the patrol, the results of his schooling were almost
immediate. The day after he returned from Atlanta, he pulled a man traveling south on I-
95 for going 75 mph and discovered $225,000 stashed in the bottom of two factory-sealed
stereo speakers. Isaacs confiscated the money, which he believed to be drug related, be-
cause the man was not a U.S. citizen and by law could not be carrying more than $5,000 in
cash.
Since then, the busts have come almost weekly along 1-95 in North Carolina. Some
cases have been tricky, like the car Isaacs searched thoroughly before finding 400 grams of
cocaine sewn inside the driver's sportcoat.
Davis, N. C. State Troopers Break from Ticketing to Nab Drug Runner, News and Observer (Raleigh,
N.C.), Oct. 27, 1986, at IA, col. 1.
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no identificaton and had purchased his airline ticket using a false name.5 7 In-
deed, more than thirty-three percent of the persons stopped as suspected hijack-
ers were carrying illegal drugs.
58
At some point in time the DEA apparently undertook a nationwide effort to
draw a composite picture of those persons likely to carry illegal drugs. The
recidivism rate among drug offenders has always been high, and DEA agents
maintain a list of suspected major drug dealers in central data banks.5 9 It is
reasonable to assume that in target cities the names of these major drug dealers
are plugged into airline terminal computers, and that DEA agents are alerted
when someone purchases a ticket in the name of a suspected major drug
dealer.60
B. Operation
Many drug courier stops are based on tips (some anonymous, some from
57. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1973); see also United States v.
Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.) (airport search of package for explosives, which resulted in discovery
of heroin, upheld), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.)
(in view of defendant Moreno's unusual nervousness, a condition that seemed to intensify after he
realized that he was being watched by members of the airport's anti-air piracy detail, and in view of
the prominent bulge on the left side of his coat, the detention and airport search of Moreno that
uncovered heroin did not offend the fourth amendment), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973); United
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 668 (2d Cir.) (warrantless airport search of Bell upheld because "Bell
and the circumstances of his ticket purchase fell within the criteria of a 'hijacker profile' "), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). See generally Greene & Wice, The D.E.A. Drug Courier Profile: His-
tory and Analysis, 22 S. TEx. LJ. 261, 269 (1982) (hijacker profile noted as forerunner to drug
courier profile).
58. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 909 n.43 (9th Cir. 1973). In late November 1972 the
New York Times reported that in almost two years of passenger screening there had been approxi-
mately 6,000 arrests. Less than 20% were on charges related to aircraft safety. Over 2,000 persons
were arrested for possession of drugs, and the same number were arrested as illegal aliens. Lindsey,
Searches ofAir Travelers Stir Fears of Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 2; see Gora,
The Fourth Amendment at the Airport: Arriving, Departing, or Cancelled?, 18 VILL. L. REv. 1036,
1037 n.6 (1973); McGinley & Downs, supra note 45, at 306.
59. In United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978), the first reported
drug courier profile case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan noted
that DEA agents exchange files on drug couriers. As early as 1976 almost 75 of these "general file
investigations" were opened. Id. at 539; see also United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir.
1982) (After they placed his name in the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System com-
puter, agents discovered that defendant Morin had previous narcotics convictions and was suspected
of smuggling drugs from Columbia.); United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
("Agent Black testified that he intended.., to ascertain whether Rogers was among those persons
on a Drug Enforcement Administration list.").
60. Interview with Leon Thompson, defendant McClain's California lawyer (July 1985); see
United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977); see also United States v. Lewis,
556 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1977) ("Mrs. Susan LeBlanc, a ticket agent for American Airlines at the
Detroit Metropolitan Airport, informed DEA Special Agent Paul Markonni that a suspicious person
by the name of 'J. Hall' had just purchased a first class ticket on a flight to Los Angeles, California,
with currency of small denominations."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
In drug cases, as opposed to hijacking cases, the airlines have no financial interest in ferreting
out drug smugglers. Nevertheless, McClain and other cases suggest that airline personnel have been
extremely helpful to narcotics agents. Surely, if drug couriers respond to police authority by cooper-
ating and "consenting" to stops and searches, airline personnel would be expected to cooperate at
least minimally. See infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text; cf United States v. Walther, 652
F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1981) (airline employee opened an overnight case with the expectation that
he would be compensated by DEA).
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informants), prior law enforcement investigations, and other factors in addition
to the drug courier profile.6 ' However, the prototypical drug courier profile
search, which this Article critiques, occurs when a DEA agent spots an individ-
ual who exhibits the relevant profile characteristics during an air terminal
surveillance.
Plainclothes agents station themselves in various parts of selected air-
ports and observe travelers, especially those traveling between so-
called "source" and "use" cities. Observation often begins at either the
airline ticket counters or airport deplaning lounges. The agents at-
tempt to ascertain whether any of the travelers exhibit characteristics
matching those in the drug courier profle, making it likely that the
person is carrying contraband.
DEA agents intensify their surveillance when they spot a traveler
matching some of the profile characteristics. For example, a person
traveling between "use" and "source" cities, carrying little or no bag-
gage, purchasing an airline ticket with a large number of small bills,
and acting particularly nervous will usually qualify for closer attention
.... [The agents] approach the person, display their credentials, and
orally identify themselves as federal agents. The agents then ask for
identification and airline ticket receipts showing the person's travel
plans. More questions are asked .... Often .... further profile char-
acteristics are discerned during the encounter-a fictitious name, unu-
sual travel itinerary, or increased nervousness.
62
Once a suspect is identified, "it [is] incumbent upon the agent to detain that
individual long enough to gather evidence which either corroborates or allays
the agent's earlier suspicions."
' 63
61. See supra note 8.
62. Comment, Reformulating Seizures-Airport Drug Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 69 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1486, 1487-88 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
63. Greene & Wice, supra note 57, at 273. The following example describes how DEA agents
have sought to corroborate or allay their suspicions. Although somewhat typical, this example ad-
mittedly combines ploys used by DEA agents at source, cross-road, and use cities, while most of the
reported cases have involved DEA agents' activities only at use cities:
And so based upon little else than travel to or from a particular city and unusual nervous-
ness, an agent would spot a suspect and follow that person for a while .... [T]he next
[step] would be unobtrusively to learn as much about the suspect without actually con-
fronting him. Standing behind a suspect in a ticket line often revealed whether or not an
individual was traveling without luggage (if there were no luggage checks attached to the
traveler's ticket, it usually meant he was travelling light). An agent might also learn if the
suspect had a rapid turnaround time for a lengthy flight or if the suspect had or was about
to pay for a ticket with cash, usually small denominations ....
Upon initial contact with a subject, it was DEA policy to "identify themselves and
request that the people produce identification .... "
The first request was always for a plane ticket to discover destination, turnaround
time, and method of payment. The next request was for a driver's license to ascertain if the
suspect was traveling under an alias ....
[T]he agent was always careful to give the suspect the impression that he was never
under arrest or in custody during the contact and was always free to go. Regardless of
whether this was true, it was certain that the agent would testify to this sequence of events
at trial. The next step was to explain the agent's purpose to the suspect and to ask him if
he would consent to a cursory search of a bag or his person for narcotics. The agent
always stresses that if the suspect is clean, they have nothing to worry about .... If the
suspect was sharp enough to ask the agent what would happen in the event consent was not
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C. Predictive Value
As a predictive scheme the drug courier profile constitutes a hybridization
of clinical and statistical models. Clinical predictions, based on the subjective
judgments of experienced decision-makers, focus on the uniqueness of individu-
als. Statistical predictions rely on "formulas that assign fixed weights to prede-
termined characteristics" of individuals. 64 Both methods of prediction prompt
"questions of accuracy and questions of legitimacy."' 65 Legal critics stress that
predictive techniques are not legitimate because they fail to treat individuals as
autonomous persons.
66
However, some proffles obviously are more scientific and reliable than
others. This and later sections of the Article assess the risks of error present
when DEA agents rely on the drug courier profile. In other words, the Article
analyzes the degree to which that profile, like other profiles, depends on incor-
rect presumptions or "false positives." 67
In theory, the drug courier profile seeks to incorporate the subjective judg-
ments of experienced narcotics agents into a statistical model that uses predeter-
given, the agent would tell the traveler that he, the agent, would attempt to procure a
search warrant from the nearest available magistrate to get into the suspect's bags. Occa-
sionally, the agent would inform the suspect that if the consent to search were refused, the
traveler could leave but the luggage would stay.
Id. at 272-73 (footnotes omitted).
64. Underwood, supra note 12, at 1408.
65. Underwood, supra note 12, at 1409.
66. Underwood, supra note 12, at 1409.
67. J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 17, at 193-94. A certain amount of risk or
probability of error adheres to any effort at predicting future acts or behavior; this premise especially
applies to the drug courier profile search. One widely accepted analytical framework posits four
possible outcomes of predictive decisions-true positive, true negative, false positive, and false nega-
tive. Monahan and Walker have noted:
If one predicts that [an act] will occur and later finds that, indeed, it has occurred, the
prediction will be called a "true positive." One has made a positive prediction, and it
turned out to be correct or true. Likewise, if one predicts that [an act] will not occur and it
in fact does not, the prediction is called a "true negative," since one has made a negative
prediction ... and it turned out to be true. These, of course, are the two outcomes one
wishes to maximize in making predictions.
One can also make two kinds of mistakes in predicting behavior. If one predicts that
[an act] will occur and it does not, the outcome is called a "false positive." One made a
positive prediction . . ., and it turned out to be incorrect or false. In practice, this kind of
mistake usually means that a person has been unnecessarily detained ... to prevent an act
... that would not have occurred in any event. If one predicts that [an act] will not occur,
and it does occur, the outcome is called a "false negative." ... These two outcomes,
obviously, are what predictors of violence try to minimize.
Id. at 193.
As noted in United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), a "profile does not
focus on the particular circumstances at issue. Nor does such a profile indicate in every case that a
specific individual who happens to match some of the profile's vague characteristics is involved in
action sufficiently suspicious as to justify a stop." Id. at 601. Other commentators have discussed
the probabilistic and particularized approaches. See Underwood, supra note 12, at 1420-32.
Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson, who has noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly com-
manded a unique calculation of the degree of suspicion generated by each particular fact pattern,"
opines that "[n]either the courts nor legal scholars have sufficiently stressed the necessary first step of
such a calculation: separating facts that contribute to the likelihood of criminal activity from those
that do not." Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 216 (1983).
This conclusion is important because "the concept of reasonable suspicion 'does not deal with hard
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mined profile characteristics based on an analysis of prior cases. In practice,
however, even if the hybrid model produces decisions that often are correct, the
courts' and agents' overreliance on an unwritten and expanding profile list gen-
erally overrides individualized decisionmaking. 6 8 Thus, the legitimacy of the
drug courier profile as a predictive device depends on the narcotics agents
themselves.
The agents can make orderly decisions based on individualized judgments,
or they can make arbitrary decisions and rationalize them with after-the-fact
compilations of characteristics suited to the individual detained by them. The
agents have unchecked power to manipulate the predictive model. This reality
presents an obvious danger: "That some agents have observed the couriers to be
predominantly Hispanic, while others have observed them to be almost exclu-
sively black females, suggests a self-fulfilling prophecy. Agents who look for
Hispanic drug couriers find them, and agents who lie in wait for black females
do not arrest white males." 69 Consequently, the analysis that follows considers
"questions of accuracy and questions of legitimacy."' 70
D. Primary and Secondary Characteristics
In the first reported drug courier proffile case, United States v. Van Lewis,
7 1
testimony indicated
that the following constitute some of the characteristics of a drug cou-
rier: (1) the use of small denomination currency for ticket purchases;
(2) travel to and from major drug import centers, especially for short
periods of time; (3) the absence of luggage or use of empty suitcases on
trips which normally require extra clothing; and (4) travel under an
alias.
72
certainties, but with probabilities,'" and "[m]istakes are therefore possible .. Id. at 217 (quoting
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
Commentator Peter Greenberg has called the DEA profile "an essentially non-specific
probability determinant with at least colorable statistical validity." Greenberg, supra note 39, at 53.
68. Nevertheless, language in some of the Supreme Court drug courier profile cases suggests
that courts as well as DEA agents make subjective, individualized judgment calls. See, e.g., Reid,
448 U.S. at 441 ("the fact that [defendant] preceeded another person and occasionally looked back-
ward at him ... relates to their particular conduct").
69. Johnson, supra note 67, at 240 (footnote omitted).
70. Underwood, supra note 12, at 1409.
71. 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
72. Id. at 538. In Van Lewis a "common evidentiary hearing was called by the court to develop
more fully the facts underlying the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) efforts to stop nar-
cotics traffic" as a result of three separate searches for contraband drugs at Detroit Metropolitan
Airport. Id. at 537. The three cases implicated five defendants-William Van Lewis, Paula Hughes,
Robert McCaleb, Larry White, and Brenda Page. Presumably to prevent drug couriers from learn-
ing what specialized behavioral models DEA agents had developed, the characteristics, based on
empirical data gathered during eighteen months surveillance at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, "were
made available to the court in camera." Id. at 538; accord United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372,
1374 (E.D. Mich. 1976); cf. United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (noting
that "[l]ittle testimony was presented concerning the source and content of the profile other than
[DEA agent] Back's assertions that it is a composite given to him by his superiors and that the
profile characteristics include direct flights from shipping cities, little or no luggage, and nervous
mannerisms").
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Significantly, nervousness, the quintessential characteristic found in approxi-
mately ninety percent of drug courier profile cases, 7 3 was not listed as a factor in
testimony taken in open court. Perhaps DEA agents presciently anticipated that
courts would not view nervousness exhibited by drug couriers as "perceptively
different" from the nervousness "characteristic of 'white knuckle type' flyers or
others who were just plain nervous people."'74 Alternatively, perhaps the agents
knew that evidence elicited at the joint hearings in Van Lewis would establish
that one of the five defendants actually appeared "very cool."'75 In any event,
testimony in almost all subsequent cases has included nervousness as a primary
factor.
76
Indeed, the list of profile characteristics expanded greatly after Van Lewis.
By 1979, while noting that the precise characteristics in the profile appear to
vary, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit categorized some
of the characteristics:
The seven primary characteristics are: (1) arrival from or departure to
an identified source city; (2) carrying little or no luggage, or large
quantities of empty suitcases; (3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid turn-
around time for a very lengthy airplane trip; (4) use of an alias; (5)
carrying unusually large amounts of currency in the many thousands
of dollars, usually on their person, in briefcases or bags; (6) purchasing
airline tickets with a large amount of small denomination currency;
and (7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited by
passengers.
The secondary characteristics are: (1) the almost exclusive use of
public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing from the air-
port; (2) immediately making a telephone call after deplaning; (3) leav-
ing a false or fictitious call-back telephone number with the airline
being utilized; and (4) excessively frequent travel to source or distribu-
tion cities.
77
A later section of this Article examines and critiques DEA agents' reliance on
these characteristics.
78
73. This conclusion is based on the author's survey of reported and unreported cases.
74. Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1016 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
75. "Page appeared nervous, looking around. McCaleb was nervous and perspiring, but White
appeared to be very cool." Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. at 541.
76. In United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980), the court stated: "The
'trained eye' of the narcotics agent has loomed more prominently in our most recent analyses of
airport stops, as nervous behavior and perceived attempts by passengers to appear 'separate' have
emerged as the principal conduct justifying the stop." Id. at 35 (emphasis added). Contrast this
statement with that of DEA agents in another case, who admitted that certain drug courier profile
characteristics "coupled with [defendant's] unusually nervous behavior" served as the basis for their
suspicion. United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 991 (1982). Judge Randall in his dissent stated that "'[u]nusual nervousness' is not an addi-
tional factor to be considered along with the drug courier's profile to establish reasonable suspicion,
but is only a part of that profile," id. at 348 (Randall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), indicating
that some judges do not view nervousness as a principal behavior characteristic justifying an airport
stop.
77. Elmore v. United States, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1980).
78. See infra notes 223-72 and accompanying text.
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The primary drug courier profile characteristics have a common sense ba-
sis. For example, it is not surprising that Miami, New York, San Diego, and
Los Angeles-major port, or near-port, cities-have earned the label "source
cities" for the bulk of narcotics entering the United States.7 9 And it logically-
but not necessarily fairly-follows that Florida, with its extensive coastline and
a longitudinal meridian placing it west of all major cities in South America,
receives large shipments of South American cocaine and marijuana. The same
common sense approach would explain a "use city" label.
Added to this list [of source cities] were so-called "use-cities" or
major population centers where the DEA knew suspected couriers
would either pass through or end up with their loads. Two such cen-
ters were Detroit, where the drug courier profile would eventually de-
but, and Atlanta .... It went without saying, then, that the DEA
would concentrate their efforts at airports in these source or use cities
80
Primary characteristics derive from logical deductions about the practicali-
ties of the drug business. Thus, it is logical that drug couriers, who theoretically
wish to minimize the risk of detection or conviction, would use "the fastest
available means of transportation-the commercial airlines;"8 1 "would travel
light-with little or no luggage in order to get in and out of an airport as quickly
as possible;"'82 would depart from the "drop-oft" or "use" city as soon as possi-
ble; 83 would use an alias; 84 and would not pay for airline tickets with checks or
credit cards. 85
The secondary drug courier profile characteristics have less of an empiri-
cally based common sense component. To be sure, some of these characteristics
reflect the consensus that drug couriers always attempt to avoid surveillance and
to conceal their identities. Nonetheless, the secondary characteristics clearly do
not have the same correlational nexus with the predictive scheme as do the pri-
mary characteristics. In other words, the secondary characteristics are more
likely to misidentify innocent travelers. This fact alone, however, does not re-
quire their disuse. Rather, it is critical to assess the relative frequency with
which certain characteristics appear in drug smuggling versus non-drug smug-
gling populations.
86
79. See supra note 19.
80. Greene & Wice, supra note 57, at 270 (footnotes omitted).
81. See Comment, Drug Trafficking at Airports-The Judicial Response, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV.
91, 91-92 (1981).
82. Greene & Wice, supra note 57, at 271.
83. A "use city" is the city in which drugs are sold. See supra note 19.
84. See infra note 248.
85. In Reid, however, defendant did pay for his ticket with a credit card. Reid, 448 U.S. at 439.
86. Hypothetically, if 1% of the general flying population traveling from Miami to Detroit
carries cocaine, and 10% of those who make excessively frequent flights (however defined) from
Miami to Detroit carry cocaine, then the probability that an excessively frequent traveler who travels
that route is smuggling drugs increases by a factor of 10. Nevertheless, a 90% "false-positive"
probability exists that the person is not carrying cocaine. See generally J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER,
supra note 17, at 193 (discussing "false-positive" probability).
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E. Proliferation of Profiles and Characteristics
By 1982 hundreds of profile characteristics had proliferated either through
DEA agents' testimony or the text of court decisions in drug courier profile
cases. 87 Not surprisingly, the government, in its petition for certiorari in Men-
denhall conceded that "there is no national profile; each airport unit has devel-
oped its own set of drug courier characteristics on the basis of that unit's
experience .... Furthermore, the profile is not rigid, but is constantly modified
in light of experience."88
Not only does each airport have a profile, but a single DEA agent may use
multiple profiles of his or her own. 89 Paul Markonni, the person most often
credited with developing the drug courier profile, and clearly the agent most
often listed in drug courier profile cases, 90 has articulated several slightly vary-
ing profiles in reported cases.9 1 One court has used different profiles for incom-
87. This conclusion is based on the author's survey of reported and unreported cases.
88. Petition for Certiorari at 17-18 n.17, Mendenhall (No. 78-1821); see also United States v.
Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1349-50 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the courts for
placing a "stamp of approval" on an abstract and amorphous test), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980).
The government in its petition for certiorari in Mendenhall suggested that each airport has a differ-
ent profile, indicating why DEA agents often stop Hispanics at LaGuardia Airport. Yet the profile
reportedly used in United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978),-a New Orleans
airport stop---was relied onl in three Atlanta airport drug stops made by DEA Agent Markonni.
United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461,463 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981); United
States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 431 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1214
n.2 (5th Cir. 1980). Was the reference merely for illustrative purposes? Do couriers in Atlanta and
New Orleans have identical characteristics? Or does the reference demonstrate the looseness with
which the agents and courts treat the profile?
89. In United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979), the court observed:
The characteristics enumerated by [drug agent] Whitmore are not the same ones enumer-
ated in the much more specific Detroit airport 'profile' discussed in United States v. Mc-
Caleb .... In this Circuit United States v. Westerbann-Martinez... referred to a courier
profile differing both from the Detroit profile and from the set of characteristics testified to
by Whitmore in the present case.
Id. at 326. Similarly, in United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1980), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed those factors that it previously had
accepted as contributing to reasonable suspicion, but that did not appear in the case at bar. In
United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), the district court noted
twelve factors that allegedly constituted part of the drug courier profile in other cases, yet which
were not present in the case at bar. More important, the Westerbann-Martinez court stated: "Agent
Rose, in this case, specifically denied that being the last to deplane.., and taking a circuitous route
... were part of the profile .... He had no knowledge whether the use of small denomination
currency ... was part of the profile .... ." Id. at 698-99.
90. See United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333, 335 n.3 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (listing the
almost 20 reported cases involving Markonni up to 1982); United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342,
343 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981) (noting that "Markonni has worked for several years with DEA
airport details and has participated in more than 400 arrests of couriers carrying drugs through
airports"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982).
91. Based on his activities in Detroit, Michigan, DEA agent Markonni has developed four
different profiles. See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719-20 (6th Cir. 1977); United States
v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977); United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372,
1374 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd in
part and vacated in part sub norm. United States v. Roseborough, 571 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1978). Four
others were developed as a result of Markonni's activities in Atlanta. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438, 440-41 (1980) (per curiam); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1979); United States v. Key, No. CR77-323A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 1978);
United States v. Thomas, No. CR78-223A (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 1978).
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ing and outgoing flights.92 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Patino93 made reference to a "female" drug courier
profile. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit referred to a
regional profile in United States v. Berry,94 and a profile associated with particu-
lar agents in United States v. Elmore.95 And, contributing to the proliferation of
the drug courier profile, state and local law enforcement agencies have instituted
their own profile programs.
96
Not surprisingly, profile proliferation has produced a corresponding expo-
nential propogation of characteristics. Since 1978 narcotics sales in the United
States have skyrocketed at a rate of ten billion dollars annually.9 7 DEA airport
surveillance has produced facially impressive statistics 98 and the Supreme Court
92. See Robinson v. State, 388 So. 2d 286, 288 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
93. 649 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir. 1981).
94. 670 F.2d 583, 598-99 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
95. 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1979).
96. Royer, 460 U.S. at 525 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, The
Supreme Court Further Defines the Scope of Fourth Amendment Protections in Airport Drug Stops-
Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983), 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 32 (1984) (describing the prolifera-
tion of state, local, and national profile programs).
97. See supra note 38.
98. For example, during the first 18 months of the DEA's drug surveillance program at Detroit
Metropolitan Airport, agents
searched 141 persons in 96 airport encounters .... Some encounters led to more than one
search. Agents found controlled substances in 77 of the 96 encounters and arrested 122
persons for violations of the narcotics laws. Of the 77 searches in which illegal drugs were
found, the agents identified 26 consent searches. Forty-three searches were non-consen-
sual. Illegal contraband was seized in all cases in which consent was not given and a search
was made. In 15 to 25 consent searches, agents did not uncover any contraband drugs.
Van Leuvis, 409 F. Supp. at 539. Justice Powell cited these statistics in his concurring opinion in
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 562 (Powell, J., concurring). However, the statistics are deceiving because
they relate only to "encounters" from which a search ensued. See Government's Petition for Certio-
rari at II n.13, Mendenhall. Consequently, no one knows the number of encounters that never
escalated into searches because the agents' suspicions abated during the initial encounters. And, as
Justice White noted in his dissenting opinion in Mendenhall:
There is no indication that the asserted successes of the "drug courier program" have
been obtained by reliance on the kind of nearly random stop involved in this case. Indeed,
the statistics Mr. Justice Powell cites on the success of the program at the Detroit Airport
... refer to the results of searches following stops "based upon information acquired from
the airline ticket agents, from [the agents'] independent police work," and occasional tips,
as well as observations of behavior at the airport.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 574 n. 1 (White, J., dissenting). In effect, Justice White questioned "the
methodology of the study" and concluded that "the design was confounded because not all of the
141 persons were searched because they fit the group profile. The agents had tips that some of them
were carrying drugs, for example." Address by John Monahan to American Psychological Associa-
tion, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 25, 1982). This statement must be considered along with Justice
Rehnquist's statement in his dissent in Royer: "A DEA agent working at the La Guardia Airport in
New York City estimated that some 60% percent [sic] of the persons identified as having 'profile'
characteristics are found to be carrying drugs." Royer, 460 U.S. at 526 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (citing United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979)).
In their book SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, professors Monahan and Walker cite a more systematic
study of the validity of the drug courier profile-namely, ZEDLEWSKI, THE DEA AIRPORT SUR-
VEILLANcE PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF AGENT ACTivrrITs (1984). According to Monahan and
Walker, the empirical study was conducted by the National Institute of Justice and required DEA
agents, during an eight week period in the summer of 1982, to complete
an Encounter Report on all passengers they contacted in airports in the United States. In
addition, they kept a log on the number of passengers observed on each arriving and de-
parting flight. Of approximately 107,000 passengers observed during this period, 146 were
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in Mendenhall failed to reject outright the drug courier profile. Rather, the
Court praised the proffle's use. The plurality of opinions in Mendenhall is re-
plete with references to the expertise, training, and organization behind the use
of the drug courier profile in the nation's airports.
99
Some federal and state courts, like the Florida appellate court in State v.
Royer,lc ° have expressed concern about potential abuses and complained that
almost any airline passenger could fit the profile. 01 Nevertheless, many courts
approached by DEA agents, a contact rate of 1.3 per thousand passengers. The report
stated...
A preponderance (120 of 146) of the encounters [82 percent] resulted from a combina-
tion of behavioral and demographic peculiarities exhibited by the subject which made the
agent suspicious .... In the opinions of the agents filling out the reports, these behaviors
were suspicious but not sufficient to detain the subject.
In 42 of the 146 contacts (29 percent), the agents permitted the passengers to proceed
after questioning without searching them. In 81 contacts (55 percent) the passengers con-
sented to being searched. In 15 cases (10 percent) the agents conducted a search either
after obtaining a warrant or incident to arrest. There were "other" outcomes, such as "an
alert call to the subjects' destination [or] referral to local police" in 8 cases (5 percent).
The study noted that "of the 103 searches conducted, 49 uncovered either contraband
or evidence of some other crime. Thus the agent's suspicions were confirmed in nearly half
[48%] of the occasions in which they sought a search."
J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 17, at 226-27 (citing ZEDLEWSKI, supra).
99. For example, Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Mendenhall referred to "highly skilled
agents," "a highly specialized law enforcement operation," and "specially trained agents [acting]
pursuant to a well-planned, and effective, federal law enforcement program." Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
at 562, 565 (Powell, J., concurring). Compare this statement with Markonni's statement in United
States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977), that the profile consists of characteris-
tics that "normal travelers do not do .... These are things that even the ticket agents and airline
personnel believe to be suspicious .... " Id. at 199.
100. 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1981),
aff'd, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). The Royer court stated:
It may be fairly said as to all of the officers' bases of 'suspicion' that, although they may
indeed be characteristic of those who carry narcotics, they are at least equally, and usually
far more frequently, consistent with complete innocence. The fallacy of the undistributed
middle directly applies: all narcotics couriers act like parts of the profile, but most people
who act like parts of the profile are not narcotics couriers.
Id. at 1016.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1155 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Careful re-
view of those [drug courier profile] characteristics causes this Court serious concern that the use of
such profile, without more, could result in the interrogation of honest law-abiding citizens as easily
as it could the apprehension of criminals."); United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 567 (6th Cir.)
(DEA agents tend to characterize any and every city in the nation as a source or crossroads city),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979).
In United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), the court
observed:
The "Drug Courier Profile" which Agent Rose allegedly relied upon in stopping Torres
and Westerbann, is not a "talisman"; its use does not obviate the need for traditional analy-
sis.... Firstly, no evidence was offered in support of the accuracy of the profile. Secondly,
the profile has a chameleon-like quality; it seems to change itself to fit the facts of each
case.... Having concluded that individually, the factors present here are not by them-
selves "specific and articulable" facts upon which to base a reasonable suspicion, the court
must still determine whether, when viewed collectively, they amount to a reasonable suspi-
cion. They do not. Normally, nothing plus nothing equals nothing. Such is the case here.
Id. at 700-02. And in United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), the court stated:
Our own fear concerning use of the profile by the courts automatically to establish reason-
able suspicion we have previously expressed: because most of the characteristics are appli-
cable as much to innocent as to suspect individuals, the mechanistic use of the profile by
the courts without examining the totality of the circumstances could result in blanket ap-
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have seemed willing to lend their imprimatur to the "subjective avowals" of
DEA agents who claimed that they could "tell a criminal when" they saw one
and that they knew "from ... experience that the guilty look and act differently
from the innocent."' 0 2 Some courts have gone further, viewing the profile as
nearly sacrosanct. For example, in State v. Grant,10 3 a Maryland appellate court
stated: "Far from being unreasonable, the investigative behavior in the case was
a model of both thoroughness and restraint. Had they done other than what
they did, the police would have been derelict and the scourge upon our society
that is the drug traffic would have gone on unabated."' 4 Consequently, the
flexible and moderately expansive, chameleon-like initial drug courier profile list
rapidly grew into an acrodont reptile of gargantuan proportion.
Although the Mendenhall decision and its progeny played a major role in
the proliferation of profiles and characteristics, 10 5 another factor unquestionably
contributed greatly to the growth spurt. DEA agents in one of the earlier drug
courier profile cases "made an in camera presentation to the court to establish
[the drug courier profile characteristics'] reliability." 10 6 Because the court at the
time was convinced of the profile's reliability, the "profile was not written down,
nor was it made clear to agents exactly how many or what combination of the
characteristics needed to be present in order to justify an investigative stop or an
arrest."
107
The fact the drug courier profile was unwritten and ever-expanding, cou-
pled with the way in which courts discussed the profile, spurred its tremendous
growth. For example, DEA agents often gave no testimony on the particular
profile used. Rather, courts in some instances simply listed the observed charac-
proval of police seizures of innocent citizens .... Compounding this fear is the facility
with which profile characteristics may be manipulated by overzealous law enforcement
officers.
Id. at 599.
As representative samplings of cases decided in the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits that view profile characteristics as consistent with innocence, see United
States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913,
916 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977). The "consistent
with innocence" analysis does not end the inquiry.
102. Royer, 389 So. 2d at 1016 n.4. The full textual reference reads:
[Officer] Johnson stated that he was able to detect a difference in the manner or type of
wariness exhibited by a narcotics courier as opposed to the "perceptibly different type of
nervousness" characteristic of "white knuckle type" flyers or others who were just plain
nervous people. The effect of any such amateur forensic psychiatry must be completely
disregarded.... [1]t would be gravely dangerous to the very basis of our system to attach
any legal credence to the subjective avowals of a policeman (or anyone else) that he can tell
a criminal when he sees one or that he knows "from his experience" that the guilty look or
act differently from the innocent.
Id.
103. 55 Md. App. 1, 461 A.2d 524 (1983), cert. dismissed, 299 Md. 309, 473 A.2d 455 (1984).
104. Id. at 5-6, 461 A.2d at 525.
105. See infra notes 327-38 and accompanying text.
106. United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. Van
Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (discussing in camera hearings), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
107. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977).
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teristics supporting the agents' reasonable suspicions. s0 8 In other cases courts
included the rational inferences drawn by DEA agents from their observa-
tions. 10 9 In still other cases, courts referred to one or more drug courier profiles
testified to by DEA agents but then failed to clarify whether profile references
were included for illustrative purposes or because agents claimed reliance on the
profiles. 1"
0
Uncatalogued characteristics, which DEA agents brought to the attention
of courts during suppression hearings, ' 1 often found their way into published
opinions. Thus, it is not surprising that DEA agents and judges, reading previ-
ously published opinions, elevated conduct that originally did not constitute part
of the profile to full-fledged proffle status. For example, the fact a passenger
took an "early morning flight" originally did not constitute a primary or secon-
dary profile characteristic. Now, however, it is considered a significant profile
characteristic. In the federal system the characteristic was first mentioned in the
Supreme Court's June 1980 Reid decision." 2 Significantly, at that time only
about fifty percent of the drug couriers at the Detroit airport-one of the air-
ports with the most drug courier stops-arrived on early morning flights.' 
13
Similarly, one of the factors observed (but not identified as part of the drug
courier profile) in the first reported drug courier profile case 114 -passengers who
tried to conceal the fact they were traveling companions-became a drug courier
profile characteristic in the second reported drug courier profile case." 
5
The lack of congruence between the facts in a particular case and the char-
acteristics listed in a particular profile has not escaped judicial scrutiny alto-
gether. 116 Even internal inconsistencies have been noted. For example, in
108. See United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1979).
109. See United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1980).
110. See United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
910 (1979).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 72-85.
112. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (late afternoon
flight); United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (morning flight); United States v.
Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (evening flight), aff'd in part and vacated in part without
opinion sub nom. United States v. Roseborough, 571 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Van
Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (morning flight), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Lewis,
556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
114. The first reported case, Van Lewis, actually involved five defendants and three separate
arrests. Van Lewis was arrested on July 9, 1975, Pamela Hughes was arrested on October 6, 1975,
and McCaleb, White, and Page were arrested as they deplaned on October 28, 1975. Following a
joint hearing on the defendants' motions to suppress, the court entered its order on March 3, 1976.
See Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535.
115. See United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd in part and
vacated in part without opinion sub nom. United States v. Roseborough, 571 F.2d 584 (6th Cir.
1978).
116. In United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978), the court found prima facie
evidence that supported only four of eleven listed characteristics, and then immediately discounted
two of the characteristics because the DEA agent lacked the information at the time of the stop. Id.
at 915. The Magistrate's Report in United States v. Thomas, No. CR-78-223A (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3,
1978), noted: "[The Drug Courier Profile as propounded in the stipulated testimony of agent
Markonni in this case does not perfectly conform to descriptions of the Profile which appear in the
reported cases." Id. at 11 n.2.
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United States v. Westerbann-Martinez117 the court stated:
Agent Rose, in this case, specifically denied that being the last to
deplane ... and taking a circuitous route ... were part of the pro-
file.... He had no knowledge whether the use of small denomination
currency ... was part of the profile .... On the other hand, while
Agent Rose testified that being Hispanic was part of the profile, that
factor was not mentioned in any of the other cases.118
Nevertheless, DEA agents continue to use and testify about inconsistent drug
courier profile characteristics.
As this Article discusses later,119 the prototypical drug courier profile en-
tails many inconsistent characteristics. Given the plethora of profile charactis-
ties that DEA agents mention in their testimony and that courts explicitly or
implicitly find significant, a great risk arises: Rather than use the profile as a
reliable guideline, agents may selectively modify the profile during the initial
stop and thereafter customize it to fit any hapless traveler who had the misfor-
tune to catch the agent's "trained eye." The multiplicity of inconsistent profile
characteristics stands in contrast to the Supreme Court's characterization of the
profile's use as well planned and highly specialized. 120 This multiplicity of in-
consistent characteristics strongly suggests that agents justify the great majority
of airport drug courier stops retrospectively. Agents use what they learn after
detaining an individual rather than match an individual to a preconceived, well-
thought-out profile that operates as a reliable and accurate detection device. 121
F. Categorization of the Drug Courier Profile and Its Characteristics
A mnemonic device simplistically illustrates the ease with which agents and
the courts can categorize most profile factors-Environment, Evasion, Eccen-
tricity, and Earmark. Environment factors are those from which DEA agents
can infer access to drug distributors or users-for example, traveling between
source cities and use cities. Evasion factors are those from which DEA agents
can infer an attempt to avoid surveillance or conceal identity-for example, pay-
ing for a ticket with cash and checking no baggage. Eccentricity factors are
those from which DEA agents can infer a state of emotional arousal-for exam-
117. 435 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
118. Id. at 698. Later, in United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1353 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979),
however, DEA agents listed ethnic background as an indicia of criminality.
119. See infra notes 126-90 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 99.
121. In Westerbann-Marinez the court stated:
This court is not prepared to usher in the day in this country when, without stronger
objective incriminatory evidence, any person may be subject to a police stop after arriving
by plane in an airport merely because an agent subjectively concludes that repeated looking
around is a manifestation of nervousness. It is not too difficult to see the eventual result of
such a decision. When it becomes known that looking around will justify a conclusion of
nervousness which in turn may justify an investigative stop, narcotics couriers will then
deplane and proceed to their destinations without looking around. At that point, the gov-
ernment will presumably argue that people who look straight ahead after deplaning are
subject to investigative stops.
Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. at 699.
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ple, rapid breathing and shaky hands. Earmark factors are related to status or
personal appearance characteristics of the drug courier-for example, age, race,
and gender.'
22
Simple categorization, however, neither illuminates the drug courier profile
sufficiently for the uncritical eye, nor unmasks the presumptive, if not preclusive,
significance courts accord the DEA agent's "trained eye."' 12 3 For example, the
travel habits of a drug courier are given preclusive significance by the courts
despite their similarity to an innocent person's itinerary. The allegedly evasive
conduct is so "common among the innocent that it does not predict criminal-
ity"; 124 and the "use of personal characteristics to infer propensity to commit a
crime [is] problematic."' 125 Thus, this Article undertakes a more critical and
detailed analysis of the profiles and of all factors influencing airport drug stops.
To demonstrate the extent to which drug courier profile characteristics
have proliferated, this section of the Article examines those factors (conduct or
characteristics) that DEA agents have deemed sufficiently significant to warrant
the detention of airline passengers. The following discussion presents a list of
factors categorized under seven topical headings: (1) Reservations and Ticket
Purchases; (2) Airports and Flights; (3) Nervousness and Associated Behavior;
(4) Significance of Luggage; (5) Companions (Traveled With or Picked Up By);
(6) Personal Characteristics; and (7) Miscellany.
DEA agents, without regard to consistency, have testified that the factors
discussed under these topical headings form part of the bases on which they
decide to detain air travelers. Even a cursory look at drug courier profile cases
reveals inconsistencies among some of the factors. A detailed and analytical
review of the scores of reported and unreported drug courier profile cases dem-
onstrates not only the inconsistency, but also the absurdity among some of the
factors. The discussion contrasts and compares the more significant, recurring,
and absurd profile factors.
1. Reservations and Ticket Purchases
In many cases drug agents testify without hesitation that drug couriers sel-
dom make reservations, and that couriers instead prefer to purchase their airline
tickets immediately before flight departure time.'2 6 With no less resolve drug
agents testify also that drug couriers often make recent or short-notice reserva-
tions.'2 7 They also testify that a passenger's use of bogus or false telephone call-
122. See generally Johnson, supra note 67, at 218-22 (discussing the use of personal characteris-
tics to infer propensity to commit a crime).
123. See United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1980).
124. Johnson, supra note 67, at 219.
125. Johnson, supra note 67, at 220.
126. See United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Craemer, 555
F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977).
127. See United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Moeller, 644
F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); United States v. Hill, 626
F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1980).
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back numbers 128 when making reservations is as significant as a passenger's fail-
ure to give any call-back number to the airline.1 29 Similarly, while DEA agents
accept as profile factors the purchase of round-trip tickets'3 0 and the purchase of
one-way tickets, 13' they treat with equal significance "paying for an airline
ticket in currency of small denominations" 32 and purchasing a ticket with large
denominations of cash. 133 Furthermore, the testimony of DEA agents indicates
that the purchase of a "coach" ticket may be as salient a profile factor as the
purchase of a "first-class" ticket.
134
2. Airports and Flights
When DEA agents first developed the drug courier profile, the "source
city" designation became a preeminent proffle factor. 13 5 Drug agents routinely
monitored incoming flights from source cities. When it became necessary, how-
ever, drug agents testified not only about the relevance of source cities but also
about the significance of use cities,136 transshipment cities,137 hub cities,138 and
128. See United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354, 356 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1041 (1982); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 982 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981).
129. See United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1068 (1983); United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1097 (1981).
130. See United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977).
131. See United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981); United States v.
Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir. 1980).
132. See United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Van Lewis,
409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub noam. United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
133. See United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977) (listing as drug profile characteristics tickets "purchased
with cash using bills of small or large denominations").
134. The significance of this factor-flying first class-is not readily apparent except to the ex-
tent drug couriers can afford a first class ticket and want to deplane first. DEA agent Markonni's
deposition in Florida v. Ellis, No. 80-8114CF (17th Judicial Circuit), rev'd, No. 80-2044, slip op.
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1981) (per curiam), nevertheless contains these revealing remarks:
A. It was a first class seat. He was flying first class.
Q. Does that make any difference?
A. ... We do see some real-I hesitate to use the word-slimeballs, you know, some real
dirt bags, that obviously could not afford, unless they were doing something, to fly first
class.
Deposition of DEA Agent Paul J. Markonni at 20, Ellis.
135. For a definition of the term "source city," see supra note 19.
136. For a definition of the term "use city," see supra note 19. Few places can escape the use
city designation. New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Atlanta are often mentioned as use cities, but
drug couriers have been stopped on their way to Austin, United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765 (5th
Cir. 1982); Birmingham, United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1979); Charlotte, State v. Grimmett, 54 N.C. App. 494, 284 S.E.2d 144 (1981), disc. rev. denied and
appeal dismissed, 305 N.C. 304, 290 S.E.2d 706 (1982); Chattanooga, United States v. Bowles, 625
F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980); Dayton, United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1041 (1982); Indianapolis, United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); Kansas City, United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1980); New-
ark, United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980); and Tulsa, United States v. McCranie,
703 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983), among other places.
Fort Lauderdale, Florida has the dubious distinction of being both a cocaine source city, see
United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983), and a
heroin use city, see United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871
(1979).
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cross-road cities. 139 And, as expected, "outgoing flights" have become as im-
portant as "incoming flights."' 14 A greater inconsistency surfaces, however,
when DEA agents testify about frequent, short turn-around trips to and from
source cities. With little regard for consistency, DEA agents testify that each of
the following constitutes a prominent profile factor: (1) Non-stop or direct
flights to and from source cities; 14 1 and (2) Circuitous routes or changing air-
lines or flights to and from source cities. 142
3. Nervousness and Associated Behavior
Despite drug agents' testimony that they can detect "growing nervous-
ness"' 143 or tell-tale eyes, 144 there is no uniform or coherent list of profile factors
relating to nervousness. 145 Walking quickly is considered a prime behavior fac-
tor, 14 6 but so is walking slowly. 14 7 Walking in an unusual pattern through the
terminal 14 8 and rushing to the restroom after deplaning 14 9 appear just as signifi-
cant as leaving the terminal in a hurried and nervous manner. 150 And although
perspiring profusely,151 shortness of breath, 152 and becoming nervous during an
137. Dallas/Ft. Worth, Detroit, Atlanta, San Diego, Los Angeles, New York, and San Juan
have been classified as "transshipment," "crossroads" or "hub" cities-namely, cities through which
couriers travel and make connections on flights to use cities. See United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d
342 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981) (Dallas), cert denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Craemer,
555 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1977) (Los Angeles, New York, San Juan); United States v. McClain, 452 F.
Supp. 195 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (San Diego); United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (Dallas/Ft. Worth).
138. United States v. Thomas, No. CR78-223A, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 1978) (Atlanta).
139. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (Detroit).
140. See Robinson v. State, 388 So. 2d 286, 288 n. 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("incoming flight"
profile).
141. See, e.g., United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1980).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1979).
144. In Wilson v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1065, 185 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (1982),
superseded, 34 Cal. 3d 777, 670 P.2d 325, 195 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983), cert denied, 466 U.S 944
(1984), the drug agent testified that "the specific type of eye contact he had with [defendant] Rashan
Wilson was similar to the eye contact he had with others who were drug couriers." In her Article,
Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, Professor Sherri Lynn Johnson cautions against adding
"the predictive power of [ethnology] and race to the predictive power of a furtive gesture," noting
that "nonverbal cues, including eye contact, posture, and body movements, vary among subcul-
tures." Johnson, supra note 67, at 238.
145. "[T]wo of the prime behavior factors relied upon are in apparent conflict: calmness dis-
played in the baggage area and nervousness exhibited while walking through the terminal." Com-
ment, supra note 12, at 130 n.96
146. United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854, 855 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ballard, 573
F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 540 (E.D. Mich. 1976),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011
(1978).
147. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d
526, 528 (5th Cir. 1980).
148. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1979).
149. United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Key, 375 So. 2d 1354,
1355 (La. 1979).
150. United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 (6th Cir. 1978).
151. United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Robinson, 625
F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1980).
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identification stop,153 comprise stock, boiler-plate profile factors-appearing
"cool" 154 and exhibiting a "calm demeanor"155-also constitute profile factors.
4. Significance of Luggage
All air travelers fit at least one of the profile'factors regarding the use of
luggage. DEA agents deem it significant when air travelers check no luggage.
156
They also consider the following as decisive proffle factors: Continuing to stare
at a suitcase after checking it;157 failing to claim luggage at the baggage claim
area; 15 8 switching baggage claim stubs; 159 having a companion claim the lug-
gage;160 and placing an identification tag on checked luggage that differs from
other forms of identification. 161 Similarly, DEA agents testify inconsistently re-
garding the amount of luggage an air traveler carries. Carrying no luggage is as
noteworthy as carrying a small tote bag, 162 a medium-size bag, 163 two bulky
garment bags, 164 "two apparently heavy-laden suitcases,"' 165 or four pieces of
luggage. 166 Furthermore, agents speak inconsistently regarding the significance
of the manner in which air travelers handle their luggage or possessions. For
example, both disassociative behavior towards a briefcase 167 and holding a brief-
case firmly 168 appear as profile factors in the case law.
152. United States v. Smith, 649 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1068 (1983); United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied,
454 U.S..1097 (1981).
153. United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1043 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933
(1983); United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1097 (1981); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1979).
154. United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 541 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
155. See United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878
(1979).
156. See United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1037-38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1979); United States v.
Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977).
157. United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir. 1981).
158. See United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
159. United States v. Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069, 1071 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980).
160. United States v. Dewberry, 425 F Supp. 1336, 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
161. Few drug couriers would place their correct names and addresses on baggage that con-
tained illegal drugs. See United States v. Ramirez Cifuentes, 682 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1982).
162. United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 991 (1982).
163. United States v. West, 495 F. Supp. 871, 872 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd, 651 F.2d 71 (1st Cir.
1981), vacated, 463 U.S. 1201 (1983).
164. United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 852
(1986).
165. State v. Royer, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980),petition denied, 397 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
166. United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 500 (2d Cir. 1979).
167. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 986 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981).
168. United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 1979).
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5. Companions
The following inconsistent proffle factors regarding drug couriers and their
companions appear repeatedly in drug profle cases: an individual traveling
alone;169 two or more people traveling together;170 people who travel together,




Depending on which case is read, a typical drug courier is either a black
male,1 73 a female,1 74 a black female, 175 an Hispanic person, 176 or a young per-
son 177 who may be "sloppily dressed"' 178 or "smartly dressed."' 179 And, of
course, the drug courier can have a Fu Manchu mustache or collar-length
hair.180
7. Miscellany
The topical heading "Miscellany," with its omnibus implications, dramati-
cally illustrates how incongruous and fatuous drug courier profle factors have
become. For example, drug agents treat the following drug courier profile fac-
tors with equal significance: being the first, or one of the first, passengers to
deplane; 18 1 being the last passenger to deplane;' 82 and deplaning from the mid-
169. A review of the more than 140 reported drug courier profile cases between 1976 and 1986
indicates that most of the drug couriers traveled alone. See, eg., United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d
882, 883 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978).
170. United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1980).
171. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d
526, 535 (5th Cir. 1980).
172. United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 982 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981).
173. Agent Markonni testified that "whites who indulge in controlled substances tend to prefer
cocaine, while similarly situated blacks tend, to favor heroin. It follows, then, that a black arriving
from a major heroin distribution point arouses greater suspicion, ceteris paribus, than one arriving
from a major cocaine distribution point." United States v. Coleman, 450 F. Supp. 433, 439 n.7 (E.D.
Mich. 1978); see also United States v. Thomas, No. CR78-223A, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3,
1978) (DEA agent stopped a black male over forty with a full beard, although the agent said race
was an unimportant factor).
174. United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Scott, 545 F.2d
38, 40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
175. United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (DEA agent Markonni
testified that in the majority of cases drug couriers are black females.).
176. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
177. The average age for the drug courier is the mid-twenties. United States v. Masiello, 491 F.
Supp. 1154, 1156 n.1 (D.S.C. 1980).
178. United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977).
179. United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 540 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub noin.
United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
180. United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 852
(1986).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1068 (1983); United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851
(1981).
182. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980).
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dle.'8 3 By way of further example, making a local telephone call immediately
after deplaning' 84 constitutes a profile factor,1 85 as does making a long-distance
telephone call.1 86 Similarly, drug agents have testified that leaving the airport
by public transportation, especially taxi,1 87 private vehicle, 188 limousine, 189 or
hotel courtesy van' 90 all constitute profile factors.
That some DEA agents commendably and candidly admit they stop air
travelers when anything arouses their suspicions' 9 ' does not obviate the need to
cross-examine agents about the bases of their suspicions. Rather, such admis-
sions highlight the inconsistencies among the factors relied on by drug agents
and invite careful analysis of the purported logic behind the drug courier profile.
A later section of this Article examines resulting fourth amendment
implications. 1
92
G. Crucibles of Cross-Examination
Although the drug courier profile is one of many useful indicia of criminal-
ity,19 3 it alone does not provide a reliable barometer of criminal behavior. The
drug courier profile cannot withstand the rigors of cross-examination. As indi-
cated above, the vast variety of inconsistent factors characteristically attributed
to drug couriers does not mesh with the concept of an "amalgam of traits that
ineluctably leads"'194 to a reasonable suspicion of criminality. Furthermore, the
critics' fear, presaged both before' 95 and during the early use of the drug courier
profile, 196 has become a reality. Many courts have accepted the profile, as well
183. United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1980).
184. United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854, 855 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moeller, 644
F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); United States v. Pulvano,
629 F.2d 1151, 1152 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1332 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372, 1373 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
185. United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
186. United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1152 (5th Cir. 1980).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 540 (E. D. Mich. 1976), aff'd sub
non. United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 726 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd in part and
vacated in part without opinion sub nom. United States v. Roseborough, 571 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1978).
189. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
190. United States v. Thomas, No. CR78-223A, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 1978).
191. See supra text accompanying note 25.
192. See infra notes 307-53 and accompanying text.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.
194. United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (6th Cir. 1983).
195. In 1972, professors McGinley and Downs made the following observations:
[T]hat a person demonstrates certain normal and innocuous characteristics, which may
have been coincidentally exhibited by a large number of prior skyjackers, can scarcely be
considered sufficiently suspicious to justify an intrusion into the right of privacy. Other-
wise it is only a short step to suggest that a profile or composite description of the typical
mugger or narcotics addict be prepared for distribution to the police for use in high crime
areas. To suggest further that the police could stop and search anyone matching the pro-
file, and who also appears nervous, etc. would be to invite criticism.
McGinley & Downs, supra note 45, at 314 (footnote omitted).
196, "[T]he mechanistic use of the profile by the courts without examining the totality of the
circumstances could result in blanket approval of police seizures of innocent citizens .... Com-
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as the DEA's scattershot enforcement efforts, unquestioningly, mechanistically,
and dispositively.
It is at best counterintuitive to attach special significance to certain, previ-
ously unreported, factors-for example, being fair-skinned.1 97  It raises the
brows of all except those with jaundiced eyes. This factor, as applied to most
non-blacks and non-Hispanics, theoretically suggests a "short turn-around trip"
to a source city in a southern state. However, its use by a court that fails to
consider what fairly and intuitively follows-that some people shun the sun or
do not tan easily-is disturbing. Analytically, however, the weight accorded
"displaying no tan" does not differ from the weight reserved for many other
weak, but often reported, profile factors-for example, rushing into the airport
immediately prior to flight departure time, 198 being the last to deplane, 199 ap-
pearing nervous,200 or placing a telephone call immediately after deplaning.
20 1
Much of the objectively neutral, but assertedly suspicious, conduct of air
passengers is readily and satisfactorily explainable. When, for example, DEA
agents noticed baggage claim checks attached to defendant Collis' ticket folio
and asked him why he was leaving the terminal without retrieving his luggage,
Collis responded that he merely was checking to see if his brother had arrived to
meet him.20 2 In United States v. Saperstein20 3 defendant Saperstein "had
checked a large suitcase which appeared to be empty, and had scheduled [a re-
turn flight] at approximately 9:00 p.m. that evening. ' ' 2°4 Partially based on
these observations, DEA agents questioned Saperstein, first, about the purpose
of his trip and, second, about "why he would have such a large suitcase for a
short business trip. ' 20 5 The court noted that "[a]n individual may be traveling
to New York for a shopping spree, or to pick up materials, samples or docu-
pounding this fear is the facility with which profile characteristics may be manipulated by overzeal-
ous law enforcement officers." United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 599 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
197. See supra note 22. An example of another previously unreported factor deemed significant
is found in United States v. Allen, 644 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant Allen "conformed to
the profile in several respects [including the fact] he was to have a short layover in San Francisco
before returning to Seattle").
198. United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 1982).
199. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1043 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 933 (1983).
201. See supra text accompanying note 184.
202. United States v. Collis, 766 F.2d 219, 220 (6th Cir. 1985). Explanations sometimes place
suspects in "Catch 22" situations as in United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 852 (1986). Defendant Borys did not make a "quick turnaround trip" to Florida.
The actual length of his stay in Florida (10 days) as well as his false statement that he stayed 4 days
explained why he carried bulky garment bags. The fact he was carrying the garment bags was used
against him, however, because "first class passengers check through such luggage." Id. at 306. Simi-
larly, it made no difference whether defendant Chamblis had taken public transportation or whether
he had exited the upper level where no public transportation was available-in either case he would
seemingly have faced immediate condemnation. United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1332
(E.D. Mich. 1977). The fact no one appeared to pick up Chamblis should provide only one-sided
solace because, among other reasonable explanations, his brother could have been late. Id.
203. 723 F.2d 1221, 1222 (6th Cir. 1983).
204. Id. at 1222.
205. Id. at 1223.
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ments in connection with his trade or business."' 20 6 In a similar case, defendant
Allen, to explain her quick turn-around trip, said that she came to Detroit to get
her daughter and was returning to Los Angeles that day.
2 0 7
In many cases the testimony of drug agents explains away the allegedly
suspicious conduct of air passengers. Indeed, the admissions of drug agents
have been as revealing as the explanations of defendants. In Texas v.
Kyno 208 a drug agent admitted that by necessity
someone is always first off the plane and someone is always last; that people
often walk briskly at airports; and that it is not unusual for someone disembark-
ing from an airplane to look around the terminal. 20 9 Similarly, a drug agent
admitted that jogging to the airport restroom to use the urinal is as "consistent
with the actions of a man in a hurry to use the bathroom ... [as it is] with an
intent to dispose of illegal narcotics by flushing them down the drain."
210
Squeezed in the vise of cross-examination, drug agents have made even
more telling admissions.
[When] describing his conclusion that defendants were looking about
"nervously," Agent Rose testified: "When a person looks to see if
somebody is there to pick them up, they pick them up right away.
These people turned around and looked for people over and over
again. They looked as though they were looking to see if they were
watched." When pressed as to how the "look" would be different "if
you are looking for someone who is not there, like a person who is
supposed to pick you up and is not there?" the agent admitted: "I
can't really answer that.
'211
Also, consider Agent Markonni's response when backed into a corner on cross-
examination in United States v. Coleman:2 12 "[W]hile defendant was neither the
only passenger without hand luggage nor the only one who did not go directly
down to the baggage area, he was the first to proceed straight through the termi-
nal and exit."'2 13 No other reported case before or after Coleman has listed as a
profile factor the fact the suspect was the first passenger to proceed through and
exit the terminal.
With hindsight and comparative review it is now easier to cross-examine
DEA agents about the internal inconsistencies of some profile factors and about
the inconsistencies contained in the testimony of different drug agents. It may
206. Id. at 1229.
207. United States v. Alien, 421 F. Supp. 1372, 1373 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
208. Cause No. 316,726 (183d Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. Feb. 1981).
209. Deposition of DEA Agent at 12-14, Kyno.
210. State v. Key, 375 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (La. 1979). Significantly, in Key, as in other cases
involving individuals rushing to restrooms, drug agents had not accosted the suspects before the
suspects felt the urge to go to the bathroom. Id.; see United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 767 (5th
Cir. 1982) (Morin already stood at the "urinal in the otherwise empty restroom [when Officer
Wolsch] stepped up to his right side"). Note, however, that the agents in Key believed Key had
"discovered he was under surveillance" and ran "for the men's room when he realized he was unable
to elude the following officers." Key, 375 So. 2d at 1359 (Summers, C.J., dissenting.)
211. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
212. 450 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
213. Id. at 435 n.2.
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not be intuitive, but "[a]gent Anderson testified that drug couriers often disem-
bark last in order to have a clear view of the terminal so that they more easily
can detect government agents." 2 14 However, in United States v. Westerbann-
Martinez,2 15 agent Rose specifically denied that being last to deplane was part of
the profile,2 16 and Agent Whitmore in United States v. Price2 17 noted that de-
fendant "Price held up the line of disembarking passengers, apparently in order
to scan the area before entering the corridor." 218 Even within the same judicial
district, courts note the inconsistencies. In United States v. Garvin,219 a rare
case in that the judge fbund defendant's testimony on all crucial points more
credible than the drug agent's, 220 the court observed:
Like all the judges in this District Court, in different cases this
Court has heard testimony from the O'Hare narcotics detail in which
the deplaning passenger who is first off the plane coming in from Flor-
ida is suspect because in a hurry, the deplaning passenger who is
among the last to emerge from the runway is suspect because obviously
delaying, and the deplaning passenger who is in the middle of the
emerging group is suspect because trying to lose himself or herself in
the crowd. Much the same is true as to various other apsects of the
observed conduct of incoming pasengers, such as the different paces at
which they go from the arrival gate toward the terminal, the extent to
which they look around while walking ("furtively" is the usual adverb
attached to what, in a totally innocent and inexperienced plane trav-
eler, might be looking around in simple wonderment at the masses of
people encountered at O'Hare on a typical day) and the different
things they do in the baggage area downstairs (where even the exper-
ienced traveler often has difficulty determining at which conveyor the
baggage will be unloaded) and once at the baggage conveyor itself. Be-
cause the "drug courier profile" thus tends to become very blurred, as
though the characteristics are shaped to fit the conduct instead of the
other way around, the controlling decisions wisely require a showing
of "specific and articulable facts" before the stopping officers are found
to have demonstrated the basis for even a temporary stop of the
passenger.
22 1
214. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554, 564 (1980); accord United States v. Vasquez,
612 F.2d 1338, 1340 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v. Garcia, 450 F.
Supp. 1020, 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
215. 435 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
216. Id. at 698.
217. 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979).
218. Id. at 500.
219. 576 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
220. The Garvin court stated:
This Court credits Garvin and not Turney. It is not credible that, stopped for what Turney
himself described as simply asking a 'few questions,' and lacking any identification save the
'R. Strapp' airline ticket, Garvin would give his real name and give cause for immediate
suspicion when the discrepancy was bound to be revealed by the officer's natural next
request to see the ticket. It is far more likely Garvin would initially have stayed with the
only cover story he had available to him at that time: that he was indeed Ronnie Strapp.
Id. at 1112.
221. Id. at 1112 n.1.
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The next section of this Article reexamines and critiques the use of certain drug
courier profile characteristics.
III. CHARACTERISTICS REVISITED
An earlier section of this Article introduced the various characteristics of
the drug courier profile and noted the inconsistencies among many of the fac-
tors.22 2 This section examines each of the "blurred" primary and secondary
drug courier profile characteristics microscopically to determine whether the
characteristics are adjusted to fit the conduct or whether the conduct fits neatly
into the profile mold. This section analyzes primary and then secondary profile
characteristics. It reasons that each characteristic follows from certain question-
able presumptions, or "theses," that in turn raise counter presumptions, or
"antitheses."
A. Primary Characteristics
One thesis concerns the primary characteristic22 3 of the "source city."
' 2 24
According to this thesis most narcotics smuggled into the United States come
from South America,22 5 Central America,2 26 or the Far East.22 7 Consequently,
southeastern or southwestern United States port, near-port, or border cities228 in
which major drug dealers have contacts or in which Mafia activity occurs are
considered major source cities.
This thesis generates its own antitheses. "Assuming arguendo the viability
of this profile component, its usefulness is reduced when the flight in question
stops over in a non-source city prior to arrival at its ultimate destination, be-
cause DEA agents cannot tell where the suspect boarded the plane without exe-
cuting a stop."'229 For example, in Westerbann-Martinez DEA agent "Rose
admitted ... that prior to stopping Westerbann and Torres, he did not even
know whether they had boarded the plane in the 'primary source city'-Chi-
222. See supra notes 122-92 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 19.
225. The House Select Committee on Narcotics reported that 75% percent of cocaine sold in the
United States is made in clandestine Columbian laboratories from coca paste smuggled in from Peru
and Bolivia. See Narcotics Sales Keep Soaring, Durham Morning Herald (Durham, N.C.), Mar. 7,
1985, at 6A, col. 2; see also United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 553 (11th Cir. 1983)
(noting that Columbia is a leading source country).
226. See United States v. Scott, 545 F.2d 38, 40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066
(1977) (listing Los Angeles as a major distribution area for Mexican heroin).
227. See People v. Warren, 91 A.D.2d 1007, 1007, 457 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874 (1983) (identifying
India as a "source country" for narcotics).
228. In United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977), DEA agent
Markonni listed San Diego and some of the Texas border areas as the most significant sources of
heroin distribution.
229. Comment, supra note 12, at 128. Note, however, that DEA agents stationed in source city
airports notify agents in use city airports to watch certain passengers closely. For example, West,
who was stopped in Miami, a source city, would not let DEA agents search his briefcase. The
Miami agents telephoned Boston agents who informed West that if he refused to let them search his
briefcase he might have to miss his connecting flight to Vermont. United States v. West, 651 F.2d
72, 73 (lst Cir. 1981), vacated, 463 U.S. 1021 (1983).
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cago-or whether they had boarded the plane in Cincinnati. ' 230 Furthermore,
DEA agents have an "ipse dixit" 23 1 tendency to classify any city as a drug traf-
ficking center.
A second thesis provides that drug couriers either carry little or no luggage
or, alternatively, that they carry large numbers of empty suitcases. 232 It reasons
that by carrying little, empty, or no luggage, drug couriers can get in and out of
airports quickly.233 Empty suitcases provide a compartment for storing drugs
purchased in source cities.
Its antithesis reasons otherwise. Travelers do not need much luggage for a
short stay in the arrival city. Parenthetically, this antithetical premise illustrates
how DEA agents can "have their cake and eat it too"-DEA agents get the
benefit of two different profiles (little luggage and quick turnaround trip)
2 3 4
although one characteristic explains the other. Furthermore, advertisements by
luggage manufacturers and retailers often emphasize the amount of storage
space in small suitcases. In United States v. Johnson 235 the court reportedly
commented that: "[t]o refute the primary characteristics of little or no luggage,
[defendant] Williams' clothing bag which he carried the morning he was stopped
was brought into court. It was significant that three days worth of clothing
could easily fit within the bag."
236
In many instances DEA agents stop defendants before ascertaining whether
the defendants have checked other luggage. 237 In other instances they stop sus-
230. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. at 699. The Westerbann-Martinez court further
pointed out that "[a]lthough Chicago has been classified as a primary source city, no evidence was
introduced in support of that classification," and it "[assumed] that the overwhelming percentage of
travelers from Chicago are not in any way connected with the heroin trade." Id. at 698. Similarly,
but more caustically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Andrews, 600 F.2d 563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979), stated:
[T]ravel from Los Angeles cannot be regarded as in any way suspicious. Los Angeles may
indeed be a major narcotics distribution center, but the probability that any given airplane
passenger from that city is a drug courier is infinitesimally small. Such a flimsy factor
should not be allowed to justify-or help justify-the stopping of travelers from the na-
tion's third largest city.
Id. at 566.
231. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). In
another case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed:
[O]ur experience with DEA agent testimony in other cases makes us wonder whether there
exists any city in the country which a DEA agent will not characterize as either a major
narcotics distribution center or a city through which drug couriers pass on their way to a
major narcotics distribution center.
United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 566-67 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
910 (1979).
233. See Greene & Wice, supra note 57, at 271.
234. See United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 985 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981) (DEA agent
Markonni stated that "little luggage [suggests] a quick turnaround trip, a practice frequently em-
ployed by couriers."). Moreover, carrying "little luggage" might also logically explain how someone
can hurry out of the airport.
235. No. CR78-262A (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 1978).
236. See Kadish, Brofman & Kadish, Drug Courier Characteristics: A Defense Profile, 15 TRIAL
47, 50 (May 1979) [hereinafter Kadish]. Although the authors refer to Williams, one of the defend-
ants, they cite the unreported Johnson case.
237. See, eg., United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 915 (5th Cir. 1978).
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pects before the suspects can make connecting flights, and thus, agents have
little or no reason to believe the suspects are traveling "light. ' 238 Notably, Jus-
tice White, dissenting in United States v. Mendenhall,2 39 said that Agent
Anderson
heard the ticket agent tell [defendant] Mendenhall that her ticket to
Pittsburgh already was in order and that all she needed was a boarding
pass for the flight. Thus it should have been plain to an experienced
observer that Ms. Mendenhall's failure to claim luggage was attributa-
ble to the fact that she was already ticketed through to Pittsburgh on a
different airline.
24 °
Significantly, only a few reported cases involve empty suitcases, and in none
of those cases was there a "large quantity of empty cases."'24 1 As one court
noted, an individual may carry the empty suitcase "to pick up materials, samples
or documents in connection with his trade or business. '2 42 Thus, the type and
amount of luggage a passenger carries cannot reasonably justify an investigative
search and seizure.
A third thesis provides that drug couriers have an unusual itinerary, such as
rapid turn-around time for a very lengthy airplane trip.2 43 Supposedly, drug
couriers do not want to hold onto "hot drugs" or stay in drop-off cities long;
therefore they make the quickest round-trip possible. Even when they take
circuitous routes to avoid detection, a rapid turn-around time is noted. 244 Yet,
it is equally true that people on business trips, people on shopping sprees, as well
as people traveling to weddings, funerals, sporting events, or performing arts
events often have "rapid turn-around time." Moreover, DEA agents generally
do not know a traveler's length of stay until the agents have stopped and ques-
tioned the traveler and perused that person's airline ticket.
A fourth thesis concerns the use of an alias.2 45 It reasons that to avoid
detection and to conceal identity, especially because many drug couriers have
criminal records24 6 or are "known" drug dealers, 247 drug couriers use aliases.248
238. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980); United States v. Robinson, 625
F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1980), later appeal after retrials, 690 F.2d 869 (11th Cir. 1982).
239. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
240. Id. at 573 (White, J., dissenting.).
241. United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1229 n.10 (6th Cir. 1983).
242. Id. at 1229.
243. See United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978).
244. United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1980).
245. See United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 540 (E.D. Mich. 1976) ("The agents
believed that they had probable cause for arrest based upon the following factors: [Van Lewis'] prior
record of having been arrested for possession of heroin, .... "), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Lewis,
556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); State v. Key, 375 So. 2d 1354, 1356
(La. 1979) ("Egan had obtained a printout from the narcotic computer indicating that Key had been
arrested ... at the Atlanta Airport [the year before] with a pound of heroin.") (Summers, C.J.,
dissenting).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 60 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Agent Hammonds was
thoroughly familiar with [defendant] Oates' reputed background in illicit drug peddling .. ");
United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); United
States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 196 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (Agent Markonni was familiar with the
name of defendant John T. McClain "as a major narcotics distributor in California, and that the
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However, it is not uncommon for someone other than the innocent passenger to
purchase airline tickets.2 49 Moreover, agents typically determine whether some-
one is traveling under an assumed name after a suspect's detention. As one
agent in Robinson v. State25 0 admitted, "well, we stop people-we look for cer-
tain things that individuals have on their possession, such as several identifica-
tions, maybe no identification at all, false I.D., and this type thing-that type of
a person."
'25 1
A fifth thesis provides that drug couriers carry unusually large amounts of
currency, often in excess of one or two thousand dollars.2 52 It reasons that cash
is the hallmark of criminal enterprises. Personal checks and credit cards provide
unwanted means of identification. Given the enormous profits derived from nar-
cotics trafficking 253 and the need to give or receive cash in exchange for narcot-
ics, drug couriers usually carry large amounts of currency.
Again, however, an antithesis arises to refute this logic. Aside from the
notable exception in which an agent sees a large amount of big denomination
currency when a traveler purchases his or her airline ticket or has his or her
carry-on luggage screened at airport security checkpoints, 254 drug agents cannot
determine whether a person is carrying large amounts of currency until after
they have stopped that person. Furthermore, only a few reported cases refer to
monies in the many thousands of dollars.
255
address at 764 Doheny #1 was used by this John T. McClain to conduct narcotics transactions.
[Markonni] had also previously obtained information from DEA agents in Los Angeles that John T.
McClain used his nephews and sons as drug couriers.").
248. "Alias" as used in this Article refers not only to assumed names but also to slight variations
in one's actual name, because the latter arouses further suspicion. For example, defendant John Eli
Williams had a ticket issued to J. Elias Williams, Kadish, supra note 236, at 48, and Mico Rogers'
ticket was made out to Michael Rogers, United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Mich.
1976). The extent to which drug couriers are aware that airline computer printouts may contain
their names is unclear. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. It is clear, however, that
DEA agents can run computer record checks of a traveler's history in narcotics trafficking. See
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978) ; United States v. Rogers, 436 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Mich.
1976); United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Mich. 1976); State v. Key, 375 So. 2d 1354,
1355 (La. 1979).
249. In State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593, 595-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), overruled by Royer v. State,
389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), petition for review denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1981),
aff'd, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), officer Johnson testified at the suppression hearing:
A. ... his airline ticket was in the name of Mr. Art Thompson, and his driver's license
was in the name of Christopher Robert Frost ....
Q. What did you do after receiving that information?
A. We asked Mr. Frost why he was traveling under an alias and why he had come to
Miami and so forth. He said he was visiting friends, that someone had made a reservation
for him under another name, and that was why the discrepancy in names.
Id. at 595-96. Prosecutors admitted at the conclusion of the hearing that this was a "'reasonable
explanation' of the disparity in the names of the ticket and the driver's license." Id. at 596 n.1.
250. 388 So. 2d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
251. Id. at 288.
252. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1979).
253. See supra note 38.
254. See United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
255. See United States v. $84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 U.S. 810 (1984).
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A sixth and related thesis provides that drug couriers purchase airline tick-
ets with a large amount of small denomination currency.256 Theoretically, small
bills arouse less suspicion than large bills, and cash avoids the need to show
identification and leaves no permanent record of the transaction. 257 Most peo-
ple who purchase tickets with cash, however, use small denomination currency.
And although cash transactions provide anonymity, this factor is neutralized
when passengers give their correct names to ticket agents or leave valid call back
numbers. Also, many people do not have credit cards or personal checking ac-
counts, and these people frequently use cash when they travel by plane. Inter-
estingly, these people probably travel infrequently and, thus, may appear
nervous as inexperienced flyers.
A seventh and final primary characteristic thesis rests on the presumption
that drug couriers exhibit unusual nervousness as they enter and exit airline
terminals. This thesis reasons that those who carry contraband, fearful of detec-
tion, look and act differently from innocent passengers and exhibit even more
nervous tendencies when approached and questioned by drug agents. 258 How-
ever, the amateurish forensic assessment of "a person's psychological attitude
involves great potential for abuse" 259 because nervousness and associated suspi-
cious behavior may result from any one of the following: "innate personality
syndrome, or a disorientation from a fear of flying or from having disembarked
at a strange airport;"' 260 fatigue; a "bumpy" flight;261 "anticipating a long-
awaited rendezvous with friends or family;"' 262 "the need quickly to make con-
nections for continuing one's journey, [and] the mere surprise from being ac-




One secondary profile characteristic 264 thesis rests on the presumption that
drug couriers use public transportation almost exclusively, particularly taxi
256. See United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978).
257. This observation is based on the author's survey of drug courier profile cases.
258. In United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1976), the court stated:
"[T]he court believes that ... Agent Markonni's assertion that he is able to distinguish innocent
nervous behavior from the allegedly more agitated and distraught behavior of a drug courier is
entitled to some weight." It is difficult to verify the validity of the narcotics agents' summary char-
acterization of nervousness. Thus, the weight accorded this factor may impinge unduly on fourth
amendment rights and cause narcotics agents to routinely list it as a determining factor. See State v.
Perkerol, 77 N.C. App. 292, 294, 335 S.E.2d 60, 62 (1985) (agents deemed as significant the apparent
nervousness of two people waiting for defendant Perkerol, whose flight had not even landed at the
use city airport), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 595, 341 S.E.2d 36 (1986).
259. Comment, supra note 12, at 129.
260. United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 728 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd in part and vacated
in part without opinion sub nom., United States v. Roseborough, 571 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1978).
261. J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR, & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOP-
MENTS, 1979-1980, at 138 (1981).
262. United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563, 566 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979).
263. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 596 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
264. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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cabs, when they depart from an airport terminal. 265 This thesis reasons that
highly accessible taxis provide ultimate privacy and the quickest means of trans-
portation to distribution centers in use cities. Furthermore, drug couriers who
live in source cities are unlikely to have family members or friends in use cities
who can pick them up in private passenger vehicles.2 66 And use city distributors
often are unwilling to risk the chance of being recognized by local drug agents
when they meet the source city couriers at the use city airports. 267 Nevertheless,
it is glaringly obvious that because of their convenience, taxis are used by a host
of innocent air travelers. Thus, the fact someone uses a particular mode of pub-
lic transportation cannot reasonably justify an agent's search for contraband.
A second thesis provides that drug couriers typically make a telephone call
immediately after they deplane.268 This thesis reasons that a drug courier often
advises his or her "source" city distributor (one higher up in the chain of distri-
bution) as well as use city distributors that he or she has arrived undetected in
the use city, and inquires whether complications have arisen.269 However, tele-
phones obviously appeared in airports long before the drug courier profile came
into existence. Telephone calls to loved ones noting safe arrival, to business
associates noting late arrival, or to friends who failed to meet the traveler are but
some of the obvious and innocent uses of telephones at the airport.
A third thesis provides that, supposedly consistent with their efforts to con-
ceal their identities and not reveal any information suggesting their wherea-
bouts, drug couriers give false or fictitious telephone call-back numbers when
making airline reservations. 270 However, innocent passengers can make
clandestinely planned trips for licit and moral reasons as well as for illicit and
immoral reasons. Furthermore, the possibility of innocent human error arises
whenever someone records telephone numbers.
A fourth and final secondary profile characteristic thesis rests on the pre-
265. See United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1979).
266. Few of the reported opinions discuss whether the drug courier travels from his or her home
in source city to use city back to source city or from his or her home in use city to source city back to
use city. A notable exception is United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mich. 1977), in
which DEA agent Markonni knew of John T. McClain, a major narcotics distributor who lived in
Los Angeles. Id. at 196.
267. In United States v. Dewberry, 425 F. Supp. 1336 (E.D. Mich. 1977), Agent Markonni
"observed the defendants disembark from a flight arriving from Los Angeles. They were met by
Michael Lee. Agent Markonni thought he remembered Mr. Lee as a drug trafficker from a prior
narcotics case." Id. at 1337.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 184, 201.
269. Representative cases in which drug couriers made telephone calls include the following:
United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854, 855 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518,
519 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); United States v. Pulvano. 629 F.2d
1151, 1152 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Garrett, 627 F.2d 14, 16 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 196 (E.D. Mich. 1977); United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330,
1332 (E.D. Mich. 1977); United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372, 1373 (E.D. Mich. 1976). In
some cases narcotics agents believe suspects engage in counter-surveillance activity while pretending
to make telephone calls. See United States v. Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193. 197 (6th Cir. 1982).
270. Representative federal cases that involved bogus call-back numbers include the following:
United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981); United
States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 982 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9,
12 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Masiello, 491 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 n.l (D.S.C. 1980).
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sumption that drug couriers travel excessively to source or distribution cities. 27 1
The magnitude of the nation's drug smuggling problem is exceeded by the na-
tion's drug use problem. Drug dealers use proceeds from drug sales to finance
other drug purchases. Cost constraints and the relative unavailability of narcot-
ics require drug couriers to make excessively frequent trips to and from source
cities. However, businesspersons, casually dressed affluent people, and airline
personnel and their dependents, among others, make excessively frequent trips
to certain cities. Thus, for the purpose of determining what constitutes a reason-
able and justifiable search, frequency of air travel does not distinguish the drug
courier from the innocent passenger.
This section has focused only on the drug courier profile's primary and
secondary characteristics. However, a similar analysis applies to almost all
other profile characteristics. For example, the notion that drug couriers con-
sciously shun peak hours2 7 2 when they could get lost in the crowd is counterin-
tuitive. Profile characteristics, even those considered to be primary, are often
inaccurate. Others are so conducive to subjective application that they give vir-
tually free rein to enforcement officials. And the profile itself is susceptible to
abuse through retroactive application.
Although these dangers do not disappear in the absence of the profile, once
DEA agents begin to rely on the profile as a proper or necessary surveillance
technique, an additional danger arises: that they will use it as a checklist to the
exclusion of other, nonprofile factors. Nevertheless, as section IV of this Article
explains, perhaps the greatest danger arises when the courts introduce the drug
courier profile into judicial decisionmaking.
IV. VIEW FROM THE Top: THE SUPREME COURT AND DRUG COURIER
PROFILE CASES
A. Confusion at the Top?
As the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court is looked to for gui-
dance by the lower courts. However, the Supreme Court's decisions in United
States v. Mendenhall,273 Reid v. Georgia,274 Florida v. Royer,275 and Florida v.
Rodriquez276 have created confusion among the lower courts.277 Notwithstand-
ing strikingly similar facts, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant Mendenhall's
conviction, but reversed the convictions of defendants Reid and Royer. In Men-
denhall the Court could not agree whether the profile alone, or in combination
with other factors, could justify a seizure. One month later the Reid Court con-
271. See United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1979).
272. In Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam), the Supreme Court noted that law
enforcement activity diminishes during off peak hours. Id. at 441. The notion that drug couriers
consciously shun peak hours when they could blend in with the crowds is, at best, problematic.
273. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
274. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
275. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
276. 469 U.S. 491 (1984).
277. See infra notes 327-53 and accompanying text.
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cluded that the suspects' conformance to four characteristics of a drug courier
profile was insufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that the suspects were
engaged in narcotics smuggling. Three years later the Royer Court determined
that no seizure had occurred when, based on the profile, DEA agents initially
approached defendant Royer and questioned him. Finally, in November 1984
the Court in Rodriquez concluded that no fourth amendment rights were impli-
cated when narcotics agents asked air travelers to step aside and talk with them.
After a brief summary of these Supreme Court decisions, this .Article examines
whether the current state of the law in this area results from confusion at the
top, or simply a narrowing of fourth amendment rights at airports.
1. Mendenhall
Two DEA agents observed defendant Silvia Mendenhall when she deplaned
at Detroit Metropolitan Airport from a flight originating in Los Angeles. They
believed her conduct was characteristic of a person carrying narcotics because
(1) she arrived from a source city; (2) she "was the last person to leave the plane,
appeared to be 'very nervous,' and 'completely scanned the whole area where
[the agents] were standing;'" (3) she claimed no baggage; and (4) she changed
airlines for her flight out of Detroit.278 The agents approached Mendenhall as
she walked through the concourse, identified themselves as federal agents, asked
to see her identification and airline ticket, determined that her ticket had been
issued in the name of Annette Ford, and discovered that she had spent only two
days in California. When one agent identified himself as a narcotics agent, Men-
denhall became extremely nervous. Without orally responding to a request,
Mendenhall followed the agents to an office. A subsequent strip search by a
female officer uncovered heroin in Mendenhall's undergarments.
279
The Mendenhall case produced three separate analyses because the justices
could not agree whether the DEA agents' initial encounter with Mendenhall,
based solely on the drug courier profile, constituted a seizure. Two justices de-
cided that the initial stop did not constitute a seizure because Mendenhall had
no objective reason to believe she was not free to go. 280 Three justices assumed,
arguendo, that a seizure had occurred-the seizure issue had not been consid-
ered by the lower court-and concluded that the agents had reasonable suspi-
cions justifying the intrusion.28 1 Four justices concluded that Mendenhall had
been seized unlawfully because the stop was based on an "inchoate and unpar-
ticularized suspicion or 'hunch' " rather than on "specific reasonable infer-
ences." 282 Applying a totality of the circumstances test, a majority of the
justices concluded that Mendenhall voluntarily consented to accompany the
agents to the DEA office and allow them to search her person.
2 83
278. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547 n. 1.
279. Id. at 549.
280. Id. at 552-54 (Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J.).
281. Id. at 560 (Burger, C.J., Powell, J., and Blackmun, J.).
282. Id. at 573 (White, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J.. and Stevens, J.).
283. Id. at 558.
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2. Reid
Defendant Tommy Reid occasionally looked back in the direction of a man
behind him as the two of them proceeded through the airport concourse. DEA
agents believed the two men fit the Atlanta Airport Drug Courier Profile be-
cause (1) they had arrived from Fort Lauderdale, a cocaine source city; (2) they
arrived in the early morning "when law enforcement activity is diminished";
2 84
(3) they appeared to conceal the fact they were traveling together; and (4) they
apparently had only their shoulder bags as luggage. A DEA agent approached
the men outside the terminal, identified himself, and obtained their airline ticket
stubs and identification. When the agent discovered the two men had been in
Fort Lauderdale 285 for only one day and observed their growing nervousness, he
requested them to return to the terminal and to consent to a search. As they
entered the terminal, Reid ran and later dropped his heroin-laden shoulder
bag.
286
In a per curiam opinion a five-member majority of the Court reversed
Reid's conviction, holding that his conformance with the profile could not, as a
matter of law, justify seizing him. 287 Specifically, the Court concluded that an
investigatory stop of Reid could not be based on the mere fact Reid had pre-
ceded another person through the concourse and occasionally looked backward
at him. The Court reached its conclusion notwithstanding that Reid had arrived
on an early morning flight from a source city, tried to conceal that he was travel-
ing with another, and apparently had no luggage other than his shoulder bag.
288
The Court noted further that the circumstances observed by the agent "describe
a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to
virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as
there was in this case could justify a seizure. ' ' 289 In his concurring opinion in
Reid, Justice Powell emphasized that the Supreme Court did not consider the
initial seizure question as the state court had not considered that issue.
2 90
3. Royer
Two Dade County narcotics agents observed defendant Mark Royer as he
entered the airport terminal in Miami and purchased a one-way ticket to New
York.
[T]he [agents'] attention was attracted by the following facts which
were considered to be within the profile: (a) Royer was carrying
American Tourister luggage, which appeared to be heavy, (b) he was
284. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
285. Fort Lauderdale is considered a cocaine "source city" and a heroin "use city." See supra
note 136.
286. Reid, 448 U.S. at 439.
287. Id. at 441.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 443 (Powell, J., concurring). On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that Reid
had not been seized when DEA agents approached him and asked him to produce his license and
airline ticket. State v. Reid, 247 Ga. 445, 449-50, 276 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1981).
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young, apparently between 25-35, (c) he was casually dressed, (d)
Royer appeared pale and nervous, looking around at other people, (e)
Royer paid for his ticket in cash with a large number of bills, and (f)
rather than completing the airline identification tag to be attached to
checked baggage, which had space for a name, address, and telephone
number, Royer wrote only a name and the destination.
29 1
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice White with three justices con-
curring, agreed with the State of Florida that drug agents acted legally in asking
for and examining Royer's airline ticket and driver's license because he fit the
drug courier profile.292 According to the Court no seizure occurred at that
point. However,
when the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer
that he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to ac-
company them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and
driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to
depart, Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.
293
Thus, the Court overturned Royer's conviction.
294
4. Rodriguez
In Rodriguez, labeled an "airport search" case rather than a drug courier
profile case, 295 Dade County Public Safety Officer McGee observed Damasco
Rodriguez at an airline ticket counter in the Miami airport around noon. The
officer's suspicions were aroused because Rodriguez and two other men "be-
haved in an unusual manner while leaving the National Airlines ticket
counter. '296 Later, "[b]efore the officers even spoke to the three confederates,
one by one they had sighted the plainclothes officers and had spoken furtively to
one another. One was twice overheard urging the others to 'get out of
here.' ",297 Rodriguez then attempted to move away, and, in the words of officer
McGee, "[h]is legs were pumping up and down very fast and not covering much
ground, but the legs were as if the person were running in place."'298 Without
advising Rodriguez that he could refuse consent, one officer told Rodriguez that
he should let them look in his luggage. Rodriguez handed McGee the key, and
the officers found cocaine in the luggage.2 99
In a per curiam opinion, a six-justice majority held that the "initial contact
between the officers and respondent, where they simply asked if he would step
291. Royer, 460 U.S. at 493 n.2.
292. Id. at 502.
293. Id. at 501.
294. Id. at 507-08.
295. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 5. The per curiam opinion discusses "principles of law governing
airport stops" and refers to "airport search" cases, not drug courier profile cases. Id. (emphasis
added).
296. Id. at 3.
297. Id. at 6.
298. Id. at 4.
299. Id. at 4.
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aside and talk with them, was clearly the sort of consensual encounter that im-
plicates no Fourth Amendment interest," and that even assuming "there was a
'seizure' for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment .... any such seizure was
justified by 'articulable suspicion.' "300
B. Synthesis: The Bottom Line
All of the characteristics discussed in Mendenhall, Reid, and Royer form
part of the drug courier profile. In none of these cases, however, did the
Supreme Court attempt to articulate any other basis establishing the specific
quantum of reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative stop. The
Mendenhall holding was inconclusive on this issue;301 the Reid Court concluded
that defendant Reid's conformance with four drug courier profile characteristics
would not establish the requisite reasonable suspicion;3 0 2 and the Royer Court,
without overuling Reid, concluded that defendant Royer's conformance with six
drug courier profile characteristics was sufficient.
30 3
Three points crystalize from the Supreme Court's drug courier profile cases:
(1) Because the profiles vary from case to case, no "bright line" exists and each
case must be judged on its own facts;3° 4 (2) profile factors that do not relate
specifically to the "particular conduct" of the suspect will be discounted; 30 5 and
(3) "nervousness," a highly particularized yet pliant and subjective factor, plays
an important part in establishing reasonable suspicion. 30 6 Use of the profile was
upheld in Mendenhall and Royer, and the only characteristic found in those
cases but not in Reid was "nervousness." The chart below helps to crystalize
these points.
300. Id. at 5-6.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 278-83.
302. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
303. Royer, 460 U.S. at 520
304. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 525 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 565 n.6
(Powell, J., concurring).
305. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441. One student commentator made the following observation concern-
ing Reid:
The Court stated that the agents' observation that Reid's behavior matched the courier
characteristics of trying to conceal that he was traveling with another person was a
"hunch," not a "fair inference," and was at any rate, "too slender a reed to support the
seizure in this case." The Court discounted the other three characteristics-travel from a
source city, arrival at a time of diminished law enforcement activity, and no checked bag-
gage-on the ground that these characteristics did not relate to Reid's "particular con-
duct." This result suggests that the Court will assess profiles in a two-step process. The
first step is to determine if the profile characteristics are particularized so that the police
can differentiate the suspect from innocent travelers. The Court then discounts those fac-
tors that are not particular to a given suspect, as it did in Reid. In step two, the Court
determines whether the particularized factors fairly support the reasonable suspicion to
justify an investigative stop. The Reid Court established that the one particular character-
istic-attempting to conceal travel with another person-along with the other three
nonparticularized characteristics did not satisfy the test of reasonable suspicion.
Note, Airport Drug Stops: Defining Reasonable Suspicion Based on the Characteristics of the Drug
Courier Profile, 26 B.C.L. REv. 693, 724 (1985).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
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Mendenhall Reid Royer
Particularized 1. Very nervous 1. Concealed 1. Nervous
Profile 2. Scanned fact of 2. Inaccurately
Characteristics whole area traveling filled out
with airline ID
another card
Unparticularized 3. Source city 2. Source city 3. Heavy
Characteristics 4. Last to 3. No checked luggage
Consistent with deplane baggage 4. Purchased





V. How AND WHEN FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE IMPLICATED
A. Historical Overview
Any police-citizen encounter potentially implicates fourth amendment con-
siderations. In the drug courier context, lower federal courts, with little or no
guidance from the Supreme Court, had to "sculpt out, at least theoretically,
three tiers of police-citizen encounters: communications between police and citi-
zens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of
the Fourth Amendment; brief 'seizures' that must be supported by reasonable
suspicion; and full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause."
30 7
The Supreme Court in Royer later adopted this three-tiered analysis of fourth
amendment issues for drug courier profile cases.
308
Historically, to justify a search or seizure law enforcement officers needed
probable cause to believe that the person searched or seized had committed or
was about to commit a crime. 30 9 And, for over half of a century courts equated
seizures under the fourth amendment with arrests, custodial restraints, or full-
blown searches. 310 Brief investigatory stops and frisks, which are less intrusive
than arrests or full-blown searches, were not considered searches and seizures
and did not trigger fourth amendment protection. 3 11 Since 1968, however, the
Supreme Court has expanded the concept of seizure so that less intrusive investi-
gatory detentions short of traditional arrests fall within the protection of the
fourth amendment.
3 12
307. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); see also United States v.
Black, 675 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing three categories of police-citizen encounters),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983).
308. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-99.
309. Id. at 498.
310. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 49; Comment, supra note 96, at 34-35.
311. Comment, supra note 96, at 34-35. See generally LaFave, "Street Encounters" and The
Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 40-47 (1969) (discussing
"stop and frisk" generally).
312. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (police may demand citizen's identification when
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In Terry v. Ohio,3 13 a seminal case recognizing that fourth amendment pro-
tections extend to nontraditional arrests, the Court held that the public's interest
in safety and effective law enforcement justifies a limited police stop and weap-
ons pat-down based on a lesser showing of suspicion than that required for prob-
able cause.3 14 To balance the public interest against defendant Terry's privacy
rights or his right to personal liberty free from governmental intrusion, the
Court used a sliding scale approach requiring the police to "point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant" the police officer's suspicion of criminality. 315 In the words
of one student commentator, "[b]y rejecting an all-or-nothing approach to
fourth amendment analysis, the Court provided police with a flexible standard
requiring less objective justification as the depth of the intrusion into the citi-
zen's personal expectation of privacy decreased."
3 16
Not everyone agrees that the flexibility afforded to police by Terry is a bless-
ing. 3 17 Professor Anthony Amsterdam, for example, as if using the proverbial
"heavy thumb on the scale" metaphor, suggests that the sliding scale approach
of Terry favors police because vague standards will force courts to defer to po-
lice. 31 8 Despite this criticism, the Terry standard for determining the reasona-
there is reasonable suspicion of criminality); cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (custo-
dial detention and interrogation indistinguishable from traditional arrest; thus, probable cause re-
quired); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random license checks unconstitutional absent
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or the existence of observable motor vehicle violations);
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (police may ask driver to get out of car after a lawful
pull-over); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border patrol officers at perma-
nent checkpoints do not need probable cause to stop and question suspects); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (roving border patrol may seize motorist based on reasonable
suspicion that motorist is smuggling illegal aliens); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1971) (officers
may briefly detain person if reasonable under known circumstances); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (limited stop and frisk for weapons within purview of fourth amendment).
313. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
314. Id. at 20-22, 27; see Greenberg, supra note 39, at 50.
315. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
316. Note, supra note 8, at 235 (footnote omitted). Stated differently.
Terry firmly rejects the monolithic model of the fourth amendment which recognizes
two polarities: either the officer effectively restrains the liberty of a citizen, in which case a
fourth amendment seizure has taken place and its validity depends upon the existence of
probable cause to arrest, or else no restraint has taken place and therefore there is no
seizure and the resultant conversation between officer and citizen is strictly voluntary. In-
stead Terry chooses a sliding-scale model of the fourth amendment, providing police with
an "escalating set of flexible responses," in which "increasing degrees of intrusiveness re-
quires increasing degrees of justification and increasingly stringent procedures for the es-
tablishment of that justification." To justify a stop, the officer "must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts," warrant the intrusion. The test is objective: could an officer reasonably conclude, in
light of experience, "that criminal activity may be afoot"? The initial stop must be justi-
fied, and the resultant inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope" to the justification for
its initiation.
Comment, supra note 12, at 114 (footnotes omitted).
317. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 50 n.12 (citing commentators who have criticized the
Terry approach).
318. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 393-94
(1974). Specifically, Professor Amsterdam noted:
The complaint is being voiced now that fourth amendment law is too complicated and
confused for policemen to understand or to obey. Yet present law is a positive paragon of
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bleness of a particular intrusion today enjoys good prospects. "[A]t a time when
increased crime is understandably viewed as a major societal problem, Terry's
focus on the enforcement need will probably continue to be interpreted broadly
"319
B. The Fourth Amendment and Airport Stops
Although the Terry decision "recasts a fifty-year-old constitutional process
of determining the sufficient level of probability to justify police action,"
320 it
was not intended to bury the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court expressly
limited Terry to protective searches-investigative stops to detect weapons.
32 1
Once the Court had carved Terry from the fourth amendment monolith, how-
simplicity compared to what a graduated fourth amendment would produce. The varieties
of police behavior and of the occasions that call it forth are so innumerable that their
reflection in a general sliding scale approach could only produce more slide than scale. We
would shortly slide back to the prescription stated in a now overruled 1950 decision of the
Court which is generally regarded as the nadir of fourth amendment development: that
"[t]he recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts
and circumstances of each case." Under that view, "[r]easonableness is in the first instance
for the [trial court] ... to determine." What it means in practice is that appellate courts
defer to trial courts and trial courts defer to the police. What other results should we
expect? If there are no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and may not
do, courts are seldom going to say that what he did was unreasonable. The ultimate con-
clusion is that "the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,'
only in the discretion of the police."
Id.
319. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 78. Clearly, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted
Terry, while curtailing fourth amendment rights. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105
S. Ct. 3304 (1985) (in communicado detention of defendant Columbian national in bedless room for
almost twenty-four hours was justified by custom officials' reasonable suspicion that she was an
alimentary canal smuggler); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 222 (1985) (when police have
reasonable suspicion that a suspect was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed
felony, officials may make a Terry stop to investigate that suspicion because checking identification
in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong governmental interest in solving crimes and
bringing offenders to justice); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705-06 (1983) (expressly author-
izing the seizure of personal luggage on less than probable cause so long as the investigative stop is
properly limited in scope); Michigan v. Summer, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (a search warrant based
on probable cause gives limited authority to detain occupants while premises are searched).
For examples indicating the extent to which lower courts have relaxed fourth amendment pro-
tections in airports, see United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1985) (DEA agents were
justified in detaining defendant briefly because he fit the drug courier profile, id. at 309; the agents'
90-minute seizure of defendant's luggage was not a violation of the fourth amendment, id. at 313;
and the agents' statement to defendant that they meant to try to secure a warrant for luggage if he
did not consent, did not, by itself, invalidate defendant's consent to search, id. at 314), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 852 (1986); United States v. Swayne, 700 F.2d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 1983) (concluding that
travel companions' close association with supposed drug seller, his partial conformance to drug cou-
rier profile, and fact he took physical possession of some of their luggage, were sufficient to establish
probable cause supporting arrest of companion).
320. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 49.
321. In his concurring opinion in Royer, Justice Brennan emphasized that Terry
was a very limited decision that expressly declined to address the constitutional propriety
of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/
or interrogation .... Terry simply held that under certain carefully defined circumstances
a police officer "is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing... in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 509-10 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 30).
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ever, it was inevitable that other chips would fall from the structure. Today,
Terry and its progeny have become guideposts in airport drug search cases.
These airport drug search cases have presented the Court with clear fourth
amendment issues: Does the initial stop of a traveler by a DEA agent constitute
a seizure? Does the drug courier profile provide a constitutionally permissible
basis to justify the investigative stop? When do DEA agents have reasonable
suspicion to stop the airline traveler in the first place? When, after the initial
encounter, does reasonable suspicion arise?322 When does a traveler voluntarily
consent to continue an interview or relocate to a private office? If the traveler is
seized illegally, but then voluntarily consents to a search, must the court exclude
the seized contraband from evidence at trial?
Prior to Mendenhall and Reid federal courts, applying Terry's "restraint of
freedom" standard, 323 uniformly condemned the drug courier profile as a consti-
tutionally insufficient basis to warrant an investigative stop, and they routinely
found fourth amendment seizures based on these initial encounters between
DEA agents and suspected drug couriers.324 Indeed, prior to Mendenhall, "the
government had conceded that seizures occurred at the initial encounter....
On appeal to the Supreme Court in Mendenhall, however, the government
changed tactics.
'325
Justice Stewart, in his lead opinion in Mendenhall, joined only by Justice
Rehnquist, approved the government's argument. These two justices found
"nothing in the record [to suggest] that [Mendenhall] had any objective reason
to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse and
proceed on her way," and they therefore concluded that "the agents' initial ap-
proach... was not a seizure" requiring fourth amendment scrutiny. 32 6 The
next sections of this Article discuss the consequences of this conclusion.
322. Some issues produce multiple sub-issues: After the initial encounter does reasonable suspi-
cion arise when questioning begins? When the traveler's identification card or airline ticket is ob-
tained? Or when the traveler's demeanor reflects a consciousness of guilt?
323. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (noting that the critical inquiry is whether a police officer has
"restrained the liberty" of a person); see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (citing Terry
and stating that fourth amendment protection attaches when the police curtail the citizen's liberty
and restrain the citizen's freedom of movement).
324. United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Bal-
lard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 667 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d
717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977).
As Professor Ringel has stated,
[w]hatever its validity, the circuit courts handling the bulk of the DEA airport search cases
unanimously recognized that the satisfaction of a number of elements in the drug courier
profile could never replace the Terry requirement that the intrusion of a stop be justified on
the basis of specific and articulable facts.
See W, RINGEL, supra note 4, § 16.2(f), at 16-14.2.
325. Note, supra note 8, at 239 n.165. The government attorneys may have relied on United
States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980), the first case to
conclude that airport drug stops do not constitute seizures under the fourth amendment.
326. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. Justice Stewart's free to leave test had first been suggested in
United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978), and later
was used in United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1980).
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C. The Impact of Mendenhall and Reid
Immediately after Mendenhall and Reid confusion abounded among the
lower courts. 32 7 Not only did the Supreme Court decline the opportunity
presented in those cases to invalidate the drug courier profile-as many lower
courts had done32 5-but it left unanswered questions certain to arise with
greater frequency following its decisions. For example, at what point during a
profile stop does a seizure occur? And what circumstances justify a determina-
tion that an airline traveler has consented to a further intrusion or a search?
Whether commentators viewed Mendenhall and Reid as "conflicting" 329 or
as "[exacerbating] the 'state of morass' currently surrounding fourth amend-
ment law,"' 330 two things seemed clear. First, lower courts generally upheld
investigatory stops following the decisions, and, second, the courts no longer
dwelled on profile characteristics and the concept of reasonable suspicion. 33 1
Furthermore, the courts addressed the question whether the facts known to
DEA agents at the moment of the initial encounter constituted reasonable suspi-
cion in rather summary fashion. This result stemmed from the fact airline trav-
elers often inexplicably consented to searches that they knew would uncover
illegal drugs.3 32 This convenient fact obviated the need for courts to address the
reasonable suspicion issue in a rigorous manner. And even when courts dis-
cussed "initial encounters" and "reasonable suspicion," some of them did so
without citing Mendenhall;333 others relegated Mendenhall to a footnote;3 34 and
327. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) ("The fractured
legal conclusions of the majority in Mendenhall leave us without guidance.. ."); Supreme Court
Review-Fourth Amendment-Airport Searches and Seizures: Where Will the Court Land?, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 499, 516 (1980).
328. See cases cited supra note 324.
329. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 49.
330. Note, supra note 8, at 253 (quoting Association of Trial Lawyers of America Annual Con-
vention, 49 U.S.L.W. 2077 (July 29, 1980) (comments of John A. Burgess)).
331. For example, according to one student commentator, in United States v. Allen, 644 F.2d
749 (9th Cir. 1980),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals limited its discussion to whether the nonconsensual
search and seizure of the suspect's briefcase were valid.... Although aware of the Men-
denhall opinion, the court avoided the issue of whether the initial encounter constituted a
seizure.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also sidestepped the seizure issue in United States
v. Fry, a case decided one month after Reid. In Fry the Court held that because the facts
before the court were so similar to the facts of Mendenhall, the issue of whether the initial
encounter was a fourth amendment seizure was inapposite and Mendenhall controlled.
The court found, therefore, that regardless of whether the initial questioning constituted a
seizure, that encounter did not violate the fourth amendment.
Note, supra note 8, at 230-31 (footnotes omitted). Shortly thereafter, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir.
1980) that Mendenhall did not resolve the seizure issue. See Note, supra note 8, at 229 n.91.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Cifuentes, 682 F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1982).
333. See United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. Unit B May), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1097 (1981).
334. See United States v. Ramirez-Cifuentes, 682 F.2d 337, 343 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982) (The court
stated that because Mendenhall provides little guidance, it would decline to accept the government's
invitation to rule that the initial encounter was not a seizure. The court concluded that "[s]ince the
stop was completely justified by an application of the principles of our traditional standard, we see
no need to reach beyond them in the circumstances here.").
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still others returned to Terry for guidance. 33
5
In short, the Supreme Court in Mendenhall provided DEA agents with far
more time in which to establish reasonable suspicion. Under Mendenhall the
agents could glean more profile characteristics during an initial stop so as to
justify their actions retroactively. Thus, the role of reasonable suspicion was
limited to questions concerning the justification for asking a suspect to consent
to accompany agents to a private office and to consent to an ensuing search.
To illustrate the significance of this boon to the DEA, it is useful to recon-
sider Royer, the Supreme Court's third drug courier case. Defendant Royer's
conformance to the drug courier profile provided officers with all the justifica-
tion they needed to stop and question Royer. 336 And when another profile char-
acteristic-traveling under an assumed name-was discovered during the
questioning, the officers had "adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying
drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage."' 337 Indeed, the Royer
decision effectively cast shadows on whatever ray of hope suspected drug couri-
ers had after Reid-a chimerical hope at best. The Reid Court never considered
whether a seizure in fact had occurred. The only factor mildly suggesting any
criminal activity in Reid was the agents' belief that Reid and his companion
were attempting to conceal the fact they were traveling together, and this was
"too slender a reed to support the seizure." 3 38 Following Royer, however, an
articulable suspicion of criminality could rest on one additional factor-but no
less fragile a reed-traveling under an assumed name. This additional factor
became known, of course, only after agents had temporarily detained and ques-
tioned Royer.
D. Royer: The Attempt to Clarify
The Supreme Court obviously viewed those present in Royer as quantita-
tively and qualitatively different from those present in Reid. Royer exhibited
eccentric and evasive behavior before the agents approached him. Royer ap-
peared pale and nervous, whereas Reid became nervous only after the stop.
Royer paid for his ticket in cash using a large number of bills, but DEA agents
did not discover until after they stopped him that Reid used a credit card. Fi-
nally, Royer wrote only a name and destination on the airline identification
tag.33
9
335. In United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1983), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit lamented the lack of strong legal precedent and suggested a return to
Terry: "Terry provides lower courts with the only clear majority statement of the interests to be
considered in this context." Id. at 1229 n.11.
336. Royer, 460 U.S. at 502.
337. Id. The plurality opinion in Royer actually suggested that "travelling under an assumed
name" is not a profile factor-Royer's conformance with the profile, in conjunction with the fact he
was traveling under an assumed name "were adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying
drugs." Id. However, the DEA and other courts treat use ofan alias as a drug courier profile factor.
See, e.g., United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1221 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lewis, 556
F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
338. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
339. Royer, 460 U.S. at 493.
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The Royer Court sought to distinguish Reid and attempted to clear the wa-
ters "muddied" by Mendenhall.34° In Royer seven justices-a four member plu-
rality and three dissenters-concluded, in effect, that the initial encounter
between the officers and Royer was not a seizure for fourth amendment pur-
poses.34 1 The seven justices also implicitly subscribed to the Mendenhall "free
to leave test,"' 342 which originally had received the express endorsement of only
two justices.343 In addition, the Royer decision supports a number of
propositions.
First, a law enforcement officer can stop and question any citizen, and the
encounter is not converted into a seizure when the officer identifies himself or
herself as a narcotics agent. 344 Second, if the citizen refuses to listen or walks
away, the officer cannot detain the citizen even momentarily without reasonable
objective grounds for doing so. 3 45 Third, when the public interest involved con-
cerns suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or any other serious crime, a
temporary detention for questioning-investigative interrogation-is warranted
if the officer has an articulable suspicion of criminality. 34 6 Fourth, when only a
reasonable suspicion of criminality exists, the investigative interrogation must
not be transformed into a custodial interrogation or a full search of the citizen or
his or her effects-in other words, the investigative interrogation must be tempo-
rary (lasting no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop),
and the investigative methods employed should be limited in scope (the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspi-
cion).347 Last, the government bears the burden to establish that the seizure was
"sufficiently limited in scope and duration. '348
340. United States v. Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193, 201 n.7 (6th Cir. 1982).
341. Justice White's plurality opinion stated that:
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching
an individual on the street or in another public place, [and] by asking if he is willing to
answer some questions .... Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a
police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of
justification.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 497. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated: "I agree with the plurality's intima-
tion that when the detectives first approached and questioned [defendant] Royer, no seizure occurred
and thus the constitutional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment were not invoked." Id. at 523 n.3
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
342. The plurality concluded that the circumstances surrounding Royer's detention "surely
amount[ed] to a show of official authority such that 'a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.'" Id. at 502 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). By noting the absence of
"any evidence of objective indicia of coercion," id. at 532, surrounding Royer's detention, three
dissenting Justices suggested that Royer was free to leave. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist noted:
Royer was not told that he had to go to the room, but was simply asked, after a brief period
of questioning, if he would accompany the detectives to the room. Royer was informed as
to why the officer wished to question him further. There were neither threats nor any show
of force .... The detectives did not touch Royer and made no demands.
Id. at 531 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
343. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
344. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497.
345. Id. at 498.
346. Id. at 498-99.
347. Id. at 500.
348. Id.
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Applying the above principles to the facts, the Royer Court concluded that
"when the officers discovered that Royer was traveling under an assumed name,
this fact, and the facts already known [that Royer's conduct fit the drug courier
profile] ... were adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs and
for temporarily detaining him and his luggage."'3 49 The Supreme Court affirmed
the reversal of Royer's conviction, however, because the investigative interroga-
tion was not sufficiently limited in scope or duration and, thus, it had become a
custodial interrogation and detention. By holding the "free to leave" test inap-
plicable when factors suggest that a reasonable person is not free to leave, Royer
limits Mendenhall and places perimeters on police-citizen encounters.
E. Rodriguez: A Bad Response To A National Crisis
The Court's decision in Rodriguez added little to the legal analysis in Royer.
Rodriguez demonstrates, however, that the Supreme Court views furtive and
evasive actions as significant indicia of criminality, and, as Justice Stevens noted
in his dissent, that the Court has become "transfixed by the spectre of a drug
courier escaping the punishment that is his due. ' '350 In addition to ignoring
substantial procedural irregularities suggesting that the Court never should have
heard the case, 351 the Rodriguez Court strained its discussion of the substantive
issue by suggesting that agents could justify a seizure based on the appropriate
facts. In Rodriguez, for example, defendant "ran in place" after seeing the of-
ficers and after a cohort had told him twice to "get out of here."'352
The Court's reasoning in Rodriguez appears blatantly incongruous with its
"free to leave" test. When a defendant flees upon the approach of DEA agents,
that act does not suggest that he or she felt free to leave. The Court, however,
reasoned that such conduct creates a reasonable suspicion of criminality. 353 If
Rodriguez had stopped and answered questions, reasonable suspicion might
never have surfaced. Only after a deepening of the intrusion, such that Rodri-
guez reasonably felt he was not free to walk away, would a seizure have ensued.
A review of the Supreme Court's decisions in drug courier profile cases
unfortunately leaves lower courts with far more questions than answers. The
procedure by which drug agents either corroborate or allay their suspicions is
fraught with unanswered fourth amendment issues. However, the "free to
leave" test is the only guidance provided by the Supreme Court. This Article
now examines and critiques that test.
349. Id. at 502.
350. Rodriquez, 469 U.S. at 7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
351. Id.
352. Id, at 3-4.
353. Id. at 6.
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VI. PROGNOSIS AND CONCLUSION
"Will you walk into my parlour?"
Said the spider to a fly.
(You may find you have consented,
Without ever knowing why.)
354
A. The "Free To Leave" Test: Alive But Terminally Afflicted
The Supreme Court generally has treated the airport as if it were a world
apart. 355 As this Article has demonstrated, the Court initially placed too much
credence in the drug courier proffle and deferred too often to the "trained eye"
of DEA agents. The Mendenhall "free to leave" test constitutes but one exam-
ple of a response designed to avert "the veritable national crisis in law enforce-
ment caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics."
'356
Nonetheless, the test suffers from numerous deficiencies 357 that warrant
careful review and scrutiny by the courts. First, the "free to leave" test is incon-
sistent with Terry.358 The specific issue addressed in Terry was "whether it is
always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a
limited search for weapons" when no probable cause exists to justify the arrest of
that person. 359 "Given the narrowness of this question," the Court expressly
declined to rule on the constitutionality of the initial stop.360 The Terry Court
expressed concern that overly technical definitions would remove initial stops
from judicial scrutiny and create a bright-line model such that nearly identical
police conduct could fall on either side of the seizure/nonseizure definitional
line.
36 1
The Mendenhall Court abandoned this concern and renewed attempts at
354. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 577 n.15 (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
355. Under traditional Terry analysis, fourth amendment protections would not disappear on the
utterance of the magic words "drug courier profile." Today, however, courts no longer deny that
they have created a separate genre of rules for airport stop cases. As Justice Blackmun stated in his
dissent in Royer:
Here, Royer was not taken from a private residence, where reasonable expectations of
privacy perhaps are at their greatest. Instead, he was approached in a major international
airport where, due in part to extensive antihijacking surveillance and equipment, reason-
able privacy expectations are of significantly lesser magnitude, certainly no greater than the
reasonable privacy expectations of travelers in automobiles.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 515 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)..
Justice Blackmun reasoned from a flawed premise, however, because DEA agents generally
target most investigative stops against deplaning passengers who not only have passed beyond secur-
ity checkpoint areas but who are leaving the airport. Thus, no airport security policy is implicated,
and the traveler's reasonable expectations of privacy are not "of significantly lesser magnitude."
356. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3309 (1985).
357. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 39, at 68; Comment, supra note 62, at 1493-1502.
358. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1493-99.
359. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
360. Id. at 16; see also, Comment, supra note 62, at 1495 (discussing how the Terry Court ana-
lyzed the "frisk" issue without deciding whether the police had reasonable grounds to confront
Terry).
361. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 & n.15.
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haphazard line-drawing.3 62 Under Mendenhall and Royer DEA agents need not
advance an objective justification for their initial stops, because purely subjective
and arbitrary drug profile characteristics provide sufficient justification. This
result arises even if a court views the initial encounter as intrusive rather than de
minimis.
3 6 3
Second, the "free to leave" test is difficult to apply.364 Ordinarily, a judge
must determine what a reasonable person would have done under the circum-
stances.3 65 Under Mendenhall the judge must determine if a reasonable person
who did not walk away nevertheless would have "[believed] that he [was] free to
ignore an inquisitive officer and walk away."' 366 The "psychological nature of
this factual question [makes] it unlikely that courts can realistically and uni-
formly apply the Mendenhall test to determine whether liberty has been re-
strained. '3 67 And a conclusion about a particular defendant's belief ordinarily
362. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 552-55. Instead of focusing on the Terry Court's suggestion
that courts not distinguish between stops and seizures, the Mendenhall Court seized on "selected
dicta" in Terry-whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restricts his or her freedom to
walk away a seizure occurs, Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16,-to support its free to leave test. See Com-
ment, supra note 62, at 1495; see also Constantino, Cannovo & Goldstein, supra note 39, at 197:
Terry and its progeny indicate that the proper inquiry concerning police intrusions
based on less than probable cause must focus squarely on the dangers and demands of a
particular situation. In adopting this "totality of the circumstances" approach to general
investigatory stops, a vast array of police conduct has been subjected to the general pro-
scriptions of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment consequently has become a
vehicle for deterring a wide range of police misconduct.
The Mendenhall Court, however, focused its analysis upon the distinctions between
intrusive behavior and nonintrusive behavior and thereby displaced the Terry balancing
test with a rigid model of regulation. The implications are ominous. Once special police
conduct is sanctioned in airports, it also may be tolerated in other public places.
Id.
363. See Greenberg, supra note 39, at 68. Professor Greenberg expanded on this notion:
Justice Stewart's Mendenhall opinion erred at the outset by taking the faulty de mini-
inns [sic] intrusion analysis of Martinez-Fuerte and Mimms a further step in the wrong
direction. By finding no "seizure" in the initial airport contact, Justice Stewart also analyt-
ically returned to the pre-Terry technique of authorizing obvious governmental intrusions
without any probability support by finding that no right guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment was implicated. Moreover, in light of Justice Rehnquist's joinder, and the refusal of
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell and Justice Blackmun to reject Justice Stewart's view,
the Stewart pre-Terry analysis may eventually win a Court majority.
To justify the stop as "an encounter that intrudes upon no constitutionally protected
interest," Justice Stewart turned to the concurring opinions in Terry. Quoting Justices
White and Harlan, Justice Stewart concluded that there could be no "seizure" cognizable
under the fourth amendment absent restraint on a person's movement, either by physical
force or by "a show of authority."
Justice Stewart, however, simply avoided the key initial inquiry. Regardless of
whether a citizen is free to walk away, the preliminary police encounter itself well may be
viewed as intrusive, depending upon the factual context. Merely because Justice Stewart
would not tolerate subsequent severe intrusions that prevent walking away does not mean
that the initial stop is a de minimis intrusion, or worse yet, not a seizure.
Id. at 68-69 (footnotes omitted).
364. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1498.
365. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1498.
366. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1498.
367. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1498. Compare United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526,
531-33 (5th Cir. 1980) (seizure upheld) vith United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir.
1979) (court found as one of the distinguishing factors the fact defendant Bowles scurried down the
concourse, whereas defendant Elmore was sitting), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980). Furthermore,
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must be inferred because defendants rarely testify at suppression hearings.3 68
Last, the "free to leave" test ignores real social pressures that impel people
to cooperate with the police. 369 Reasonable people who believe they are free to
walk away from a police encounter seldom do so because (1) they feel strong
social pressure to respond to police questioning; 370 (2) they fear the ramifica-
tions of not cooperating; or (3) they fear that walking away would create more
suspicion. 37 1 Thus, it defies logic to assume that suspected drug couriers feel
"free to leave" when DEA agents approach and arrest them, even if such sus-
pects are otherwise reasonable people.
B. The Proper Role of the Profile
Primarily relying on the Supreme Court's "free to leave" test,3 72 lower
courts have sanctioned profile stops with increasing regularity. 373 Several rea-
sons may explain this phenomenon. First, perhaps judges have sympathized
with the DEA's efforts to curb narcotics trafficking, so that they cannot pay
proper homage to the rights of air passengers suspected of carrying narcotics.
374
Second, perhaps the retrospective realization that the suspected courier actually
possessed narcotics subconsciously has influenced judges, so that they cannot
even reasonable judges have found it difficult to reconcile Mendenhall's belief that she was free to go
with Royer's belief that he was not free to go. This explains the various dissents and concurring
opinions in those cases. See supra text accompanying notes 280-83, 292-94.
368. This conclusion is based on the author's experience as a judge and criminal defense trial
attorney.
369. See Comment, supra note 62, at 1498-99.
370. The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966), recognized that a
citizen has a responsibility to cooperate with the police.
371. One student commentator has noted:
People cooperate with the police because they have been trained to submit to the
wishes of persons in authority or because they fear that refusal to cooperate will create
further suspicion. But according to the American Law Institute (ALI), "regardless of the
motive, the cooperation is clearly a response to the authority of the police."
The ALI's conclusion that cooperation with the police is largely a response to police
authority is strongly supported by a seminal study of police field stops. The study's author
observed more than four hundred field stops in two different states. The author found that
some of the questions would have been intolerable if asked by someone other than a police
officer. Of three hundred field stops observed in Chicago alone, not once did a confronted
person refuse to answer the interrogator. "The only conclusion that can be drawn from
these observations is that the presence of a police officer, no matter how pleasant his de-
meanor, implies the potential use of force-force at least to effectuate the stop if not to
compel the answers." Given this perceived potential use of force by the officer should the
person refuse to cooperate, it is not surprising that, when confronted, a person does not
ignore the officer.
Comment, supra note 62, at 1500 (footnotes omitted) (quoting ALI MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGN-
MENT PROc. 259-60 (1975); Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 465, 473 (1967)).
372. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
373. Green & Wice, supra note 57, at 284.
374. Courts tend to narrow the scope of defendants' rights when weighty governmental interests
tilt the fourth amendment scales. See supra note 319. Even now the exclusionary rule hangs precari-
ously in the balance. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But was
it a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (1984).
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exercise the requisite degree of "disassociative objectivity." 375 Last, perhaps the
drug courier profile itself places too high a premium on the subjective avowals of
"law enforcement officers whose actions are being reviewed.
'376
Whatever reasons impel the Supreme Court's continued countenance of in-
vestigative stops based solely on the drug courier profile, and however thin be-
comes the line between subjective hunch based on statistical possibility and
objective fact, courts should not allow the drug courier profile to obviate the
need for traditional fourth amendment analysis. 377 It cannot be denied that
some profile characteristics, when properly applied, accurately predict criminal-
ity. In many cases, however, DEA agents improperly use profile characteristics
as a substitute for judgment; they attempt to apply those characteristics after the
initial stop. In other cases drug agents combine numerous weak factors that do
not amount to "reasonable suspicion," and courts passively accept the results by
relying on the drug agents' use of the drug courier profile. Thus, the profile
simply is too susceptible to selective enforcement and retrospective application
to support a retreat from Terry's requirement of objective factfinding.
378
Courts must assess the objective bases of profile encounters with due regard
for the timing of DEA agents' observations and intrusions. Furthermore, courts
must not give excessive deference to DEA agents' assertions. That agents have
in fact caught many drug couriers in the Mendenhall and Royer dragnet does
not alleviate the baleful impact of those cases on fourth amendment jurispru-
dence. With the entrenchment of the drug courier profile, agents may randomly
stop citizens for arbitrary reasons or for innocent differences in their appearance
from fellow passengers. Agents then may detain citizens until the agents gather
enough evidence to "call out the dogs" 379 or conduct a search themselves. The
more significant indicia of criminality usually remain undiscovered until a stop
375. See Magistrate's Report at 6-7, United States v. Thomas, No. CR78-223A (N.D. Ga. Nov.
1, 1978).
376, See United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979).
377. The "free to leave" test is at odds with the Terry balancing test; it departs from traditional
fourth amendment analysis that requires objective fact finding and it treats airports as if they were a
world apart. See Constantino, Cannavo & Goldstein, supra note 39, at 197-98.
378. Constantino, Cannavo & Goldstein, supra note 39, at 197-98.
379. The Royer Court suggested that the use of trained dogs "to detect the presence of controlled
substances in luggage" was "feasible and available." Royer, 460 U.S. at 505-06. When given the
opportunity to rule directly on that issue, the Court concluded that dog sniffs do not constitute
searches. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983).
Place represents another chink in fourth amendment monolithic armor. Place is the first
Supreme Court decision authorizing the seizure of personal property (luggage), as opposed to the
brief detention of persons, on less than probable cause. The Place Court itself implied that it had to
resolve an issue of first impression:
In this case,.the Government asks us to recognize the reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment of warrantless seizures of personal luggage from the custody of the owner on
the basis of less than probable cause, for the purpose of pursuing a limited course of investi-
gation, short of opening the luggage, that would quickly confirm or dispel the authorities'
suspicion. Specifically, we are asked to apply the principles of Terry v. Ohio... to permit
such seizures on the basis of reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts,




THE DRUG COURIER PROFILE
has occurred.380 Furthermore, the drug courier profile generally precludes a
particularized focus. 381 Thus, dependence solely on the profile tends to emascu-
late the requirement that courts consider the totality of the circumstances before
upholding a search and seizure.
Consequently, courts should consider the profile as "nothing more than an
administrative tool of the police."' 38 2 It may guide an agent toward a person to
determine whether that particular individual is a drug courier.383 It may alert
the agent to initiate surveillance. This use, however, would not support the par-
ticularized suspicion of narcotics trafficking. The proper role of the drug courier
profile is not to establish in court that agents had a reasonable suspicion before
the stop. Rather, it should serve as a tool for DEA agents to use in identifying
suspects, following or investigating further, and stopping suspects once reason-
able suspicion actually exists.
Because the courts cannot monitor the profile effectively and should not
attempt to do so, use of the profile in enforcement should be curtailed. Courts
should consider only those factors that, in advance, intuitively or demonstrably
relate to drug courier conduct or those characteristics that do not also include
large numbers of innocent travelers. Courts should also require a showing in
each case that the agent had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain a person
from observations judged on their own merit, rather than as part of a larger
composite and all encompassing profile. This last requirement is important not
to give drug couriers "fair warning," but to assure proper police enforcement
practices and to ensure that stops are based on specific reasonable inferences.
Nothing said in this Article, or left unsaid, converts ordinary police-citizen
encounters, whether the typical "street encounter" or otherwise, into fourth
amendment seizures. Nor does any postulate advanced herein preclude the use
of all drug courier profile characteristics in establishing reasonable suspicion so
as to justify an investigative stop.384 When, however, a narcotics agent has
stopped an air traveler based solely on the drug courier profile, the agent must
articulate the particular individualized factors that raised his or her suspicion
and justified the initial encounter.385 Courts should require objective justifica-
380. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 494.
381. See J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 17, at 193-94.
382. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 600 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
383. Id. at 600 n.21.
384. As the court stated in Berry:
If an officer can demonstrate why some factor, interpreted with due regard for the
officer's experience and not merely in light of its presence on the profile, was, in the partic-
ular circumstances of the facts at issue, of such import as to support a reasonable suspicion
that an individual was involved in drug smuggling, we do not believe that a court should
downgrade the importance of that factor merely because it happens to be part of the pro-
file. Our holding is only that we will assign no characteristic greater or lesser weight
merely because the characteristic happens to be present on, or absent from, the profile.
Id. at 601. This emphasis on a "totality of circumstances" analysis requires narcotics agents to
"have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
385. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 9-3, at 48 (Supp. 1986); see also In re Tony, 21 Cal. 3d
888, 582 P.2d 957, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978) (officer must provide objective justification when a
police-citizen encounter is initiated because the officer suspects the citizen of criminal activity).
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tion based on a particularized focus when the agent's intent in initiating the
encounter was to satisfy his or her suspicion of narcotics trafficking.
A resulting bright-line rule emerges that should govern all drug courier
profile cases: All airport drug stops based solely on the drug courier profile
constitute seizures requiring reasonable suspicion before further probing by the
police. This bright-line rule would alert narcotics agents to the perimeters of
what they can and cannot do. It overrides case by case adjudications and, there-
fore, eliminates some of the fine distinctions and minor gradations that have
plagued fourth amendment jurisprudence.386 Equally important, this rule does
not thwart the DEA's efforts to stem the flow of narcotics from passing through
airports. It merely requires (1) a necessary paring of drug courier profile charac-
teristics; (2) more multiple airport surveillance; 387 and (3) a specific focus on
salient or particularized factors. Agents can identify many of the salient fac-
tors-for example, use of an alias, abnormal and obvious bulge visible under
clothing, informants' tips, association with known narcotics dealers, positive
narcotics dog sniff, bogus "call-back" number, and switching baggage claim
stubs 3 8 8-prior to an initial encounter with a suspected drug courier.
In short, "the strength of a society's interest in overcoming the extraordi-
nary obstacles to the detection of drug traffickers" 389 "cannot excuse [courts]
from exercising [their] unflagging duty to strike down official activity that ex-
ceeds the confines of the Constitution ... [or] blind[s] us to the peril to our free
society that lies in [courts] disregard[ing] the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. g390 The bright line rule proposed by this Article does not over-
protect trafficking in drugs just because it deems initial encounters between drug
agents and travelers as seizures. Rather, the government simply has to justify
the seizure by satisfying the articulable and reasonable suspicion standard.
386. See Amsterdam, supra note 318, at 393-94.
387. Drug couriers make roundtrip flights to source cities. Observations of profile-conforming
passengers at source and hub city airports has proven fruitful even when the passengers are not
detained. Data obtained as a result of these observations and follow-up investigations are transmit-
ted to law enforcement officials in use city airports. These officials, drawing inferences from their
observations and from the specific individualized data transmitted, will have a more objective basis
for suspecting the person under surveillance for narcotics trafficking.
For example, in United States v. Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 1982), the nervous defend-
ant used cash to purchase his one-way ticket to Dallas/Ft. Worth minutes before the noon departure
time. A suspicious airline ticket agent contacted a Miami police officer whose subsequent investiga-
tion revealed the following: (1) Morin left a callback number for the Marriott Hotel; (2) the hotel
clerk reported that Morin used a $100 bill to pay for his room and did not get his $24 change; and
(3) Morin had prior narcotics convictions and was a suspected smuggler in a Columbian drug opera-
tion. This information was transmitted to law enforcement officials in Dallas who placed Morin
under surveillance and subjected his checked luggage to a narcotics dog sniff test. The test proved
negative. Morin was later detained when he deplaned in Austin. Id. at 766-67. The detention was
considered an arrest and Morin's conviction was subsequently reversed. Id. at 770; see United States
v. West, 651 F.2d 71, 72 (1st Cir. 1981) (discussing multiple airport surveillance), vacated, 463 U.S.
1201 (1983). Other multiple airport surveillance cases include United States v. Chapman, 573 F.2d
565, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1978); and United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 539-40 (E.D. Mich.
1976), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1011 (1978).
388. See, e.g., United States v. Ehlerbracht, 693 F.2d 333, 336 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (unusual
protrusion under defendant's trouser leg; bogus call-back number).
389. Royer, 460 U.S. at 513 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
390. Id. at 512-13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Finally, to instill any meaning into the second tier of police-citizen en-
counters-brief seizures-"reasonable suspicion" must mean more than a sub-
jective judgment based on an amorphous statistical data so obviously susceptible
to bias, misuse, and arbitrary enforcement. Otherwise, law enforcement officials
must make constitutional gray area decisions on an ad hoe basis. The fourth
amendment simply weighs too much for the drug courier profile's "slender reed"
to support 39 1-at least as courts presently understand and interpret the meaning
of that profile.
391. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam).
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APPENDIX
The proliferation of drug courier profile characteristics is best illustrated by
a nearly exhaustive list of factors-conduct or characteristics-deemed suffi-
ciently significant by DEA agents to.warrant the detention of airline passengers,
categorized under the following topical headings:
1. Reservations and Ticket Purchases
2. Airports and Flights
3. Nervousness and Associated Behavior
4. Significance of Luggage
5. Companions (traveled with or picked up by)
6. Personal Characteristics
7. Miscellany
Without regard to consistency, DEA agents have testified that the factors listed
under these topical headings form part of the bases on which they detain air
travelers. Even a cursory review of the factors will disclose inconsistency and,
perhaps, absurdity, among some of these factors. The list of factors is based on
the author's survey of the hundreds of reported and unreported drug courier
profile cases.
Charts on the pages that follow list the factors that chronicle the drug cou-
rier profile cases from three of the most active courts in this area of the law-the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, and the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Using the seven topi-
cal headings and the corresponding alphabetical entries, one can determine the
factors known to DEA agents at the time the defendants in each of the listed
cases were searched. The cases are listed in chronological order and Mendenhall
and Reid are included on each chart for comparative review. Cases that in-
volved international flights or that focused on issues other than the drug courier
profile have been excluded from the listed cases.
LEGEND
RESERVATIONS AND TICKET PURCHASES
= No reservation
= Ticket purchased immediately before
flight departure time
= Recent or short-notice reservation
= No call-back number given to airline
= Bogus or false telephone call-back
number
= Use of motel call-back number






= Any ticket purchased with cash,
especially small denominations
= Any ticket purchased with cash,
especially large denominations
= Any ticket purchased with cash, small
or large denominations
= Any ticket purchased with cash from
large roll of bills
= Use of separate tickets when a single
ticket could have been obtained for
the same trip
= Quick turn-around trip
= Early morning flights
= Early morning arrival (off-peak)
= Early weekday morning return flight
= Short layover
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AIRPORTS AND FLIGHTS
A = Source city
1. Frequent flights to and
from source city
2. Short turn-around trip to
source city
3. Non-stop flight to and
from source city





6. Changing airlines or flights
en route to source city
7. Taking connecting flights
to and from source city








NERVOUSNESS AND ASSOCIATED BEHAVIOR
Tell-tale eyes
Rushing to restroom after deplaning
Unusual conduct in restroom
Leaving terminal directly in hurried and
nervous manner




Walking in unusual pattern through
terminal
Unusual manner of walking
Wobbling
Bumping into people
Hesitating while passing through
magnetometer
Hesitating before proceeding past
security checkpoint
Staring directly at DEA agent
Nervous mannerisms
SIGNIFICANCE OF
A = Checking no luggage R
B = Carrying no luggage
C = Checking large empty suitcase S
D = Use of empty, or near-empty, suitcase
E = Carrying small gym bag, tote bag, or T
little luggage
F = Carrying bags with only a few hangers U
on cross-country flight V
G = Carrying medium-size bag W
H = Carrying two bulky garment bags X
I = Carrying "two apparently heavy-laden
suitcases" Y
J = Carrying large, light-colored man's Z
purse
K = Carrying luggage with small padlock AA
identical to those observed twice before
by agents on bags containing narcotics BB
L = Carrying American Tourister luggage
(standard brand for marijuana CC
smugglers) DD
M = Traveling with new suitcases
N = Carrying heavily perfumed suitcases EE
O = Carrying leather briefcase
P = Carrying Haliburton briefcase FF
Q = Carrying two pieces of luggage that
lack identification
= Recognizing agent or reacting to agent's
presence by growing nervousness
= Being very tense
= Becoming nervous during identification
stop, rapid breathing, shaking hands




= Hesitating before speaking
= Choppy speech
= Quivering voice
= False statement blurted out without
reason
= Scanning arrival or baggage area
= Continuing to stare at suitcase after
checking it
= Holding one's luggage in an unusual
manner
LUGGAGE
= Two people carrying identical
unmarked suitcases
= Discrepancy in identification tag
addresses and other identification
= No baggage claim stub attached to
ticket
= Attempting to disclaim luggage
= Failing to claim baggage at claim area
= Switching baggage claim stubs
= Having person who picked traveler up
claim luggage at claim area
= Exchanging luggage
= Continuing to stare at suitcase after
checking it
= Disassociative behavior towards
briefcase
= Holding one's luggage in an unusual
manner
= Holding briefcase firmly
= Manner of lifting suitcase previously
thought to be empty
= Refusing to consent to search of bag at
initial encounter
= Holding fairly large shopping bag in
front of torso
1987]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
COMPANIONS (TRAVELED WITH OR PICKED UP BY)
= Individual traveling alone
= Two or more people traveling together
= Traveling together, but attempting to
appear separate
= Disclaiming knowledge of traveling
companions
- Meeting known drug dealers
= Suspicious hand signals; secretly passing
piece of paper
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Black male K = Wrinkled suit
Female L = Non-businessman attire
Black female M = Failure to change clothes
Hispanic N = Collar-length hair
Youth 0 = Fu Manchu mustache
Age P = Beard
Unusual clothing Q = Smartly dressed (e.g.
Sloppily dressed expensively tailored
Disheveled appearance denim pantsuits)
Casual dress
MISCELLANY
= First, or one of the first, to deplane
= Last to deplane
= Deplaning from the middle
= Deplaning two-thirds of the way in
= Holding up the line to scan area
= Deplaning after fifteen passengers
= Deplaning after twenty-five to thirty
passengers
= Placing local phone call immediately
after deplaning
= Placing long-distance phone call
immediately after deplaning
= "[T]he first to proceed straight through
the terminal and exit"
= Unusual limp or manner of walking
= Attempting to leave the airport
immediately, especially by way of taxi
= Attempting to use public transportation
to leave airport
= Exiting terminal at upper level where
there is no access to public
transportation
= Using limousine to leave airport
= Using hotel courtesy van
= Attempting to leave airport in private
vehicle
= Going to large nearby hotel after
deplaning
= Rushing or running into airport imme-
diately prior to flight departure time
= Giving false answers to DEA agents
= Giving DEA agents deceptive answers
= Stating to DEA agents that they are
recognized
= Refusing to consent to search of bags at
initial encounter while allowing search
of boots
- Having money or drugs in boots
= Abnormal and obvious bulge visible
under clothing
= Traveling with large amounts of
currency
- Having no identification
= Anything that arouses agent Wankel's
suspicion
= Fair-skinned and displaying no tan
= Fumbling for ticket
= Methodically folding ticket before
discarding it
= Bouncing a golf ball
= Carrying candy and measuring spoons




= Rental of apartment under surveillance
= Association with known narcotics
dealer
= Multiple airport surveillance
= Narcotics dog sniff positive
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